Empirical Analyses Of Queues With Applications To Elections And Healthcare by Kaaua, Dawson
University of Pennsylvania 
ScholarlyCommons 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 
2020 
Empirical Analyses Of Queues With Applications To Elections And 
Healthcare 
Dawson Kaaua 
University of Pennsylvania 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations 
Recommended Citation 
Kaaua, Dawson, "Empirical Analyses Of Queues With Applications To Elections And Healthcare" (2020). 
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 3861. 
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3861 
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/3861 
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu. 
Empirical Analyses Of Queues With Applications To Elections And Healthcare 
Abstract 
In Chapter 1, we conduct a dynamic panel data study of voting resource allocation within Florida counties. 
We find that a 1\% increase in the percentage of voters registered as Democrat in a county results in a 
2.8\% increase in the number of registered voters per poll worker. Furthermore, using a queue simulation, 
we estimate that a 5\% increase in voters registered as Democrat in a county could increase the average 
wait time to vote from 40 minutes (the estimated average wait time to vote in Florida in 2012) to 
approximately 100 minutes. Our study recommends that states regulate the number of voters per poll 
worker or voting machine in polling locations so that wait times are equated across all voters. 
In Chapter 2, we perform a differences-in-differences analysis on cross-sectional voter wait time data 
across the 2006, 2008, 2012, and 2016 Georgia elections. We estimate that polling place closures 
increased Georgia’s average wait time to vote in the 2016 election by 7 minutes or approximately 78\% 
(based on Georgia’s average wait time of 16.5 minutes in the 2016 election). This increase in the average 
wait time to vote suggests that in the 2016 election, Georgia may have idled its spare capacity (e.g., 
voting machines) following polling place closures. As a result, we suggest that states implement policies 
that require the redistribution of all functioning voting machines from closed polling places or at least 
increase transparency in how voting resources are used in elections. 
In Chapter 3, we use an instrumental variable estimation and find that patients prefer waiting for 
endoscopies in pre-op rather than reception. Additional experiments suggest that pre-op is less favorable 
due to its intensity (e.g., clinical, emotional). We also find that in transparent, shared waiting areas where 
patients do not observe the doctor assignment of others, patients may still monitor queue discipline. 
Finally, patients may be negatively impacted by waits that conclude after a scheduled appointment time 
but care less about waits that conclude early. This study emphasizes the importance of businesses 
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In Chapter 1, we conduct a dynamic panel data study of voting resource allocation within
Florida counties. We find that a 1% increase in the percentage of voters registered as
Democrat in a county results in a 2.8% increase in the number of registered voters per poll
worker. Furthermore, using a queue simulation, we estimate that a 5% increase in voters
registered as Democrat in a county could increase the average wait time to vote from 40
minutes (the estimated average wait time to vote in Florida in 2012) to approximately 100
minutes. Our study recommends that states regulate the number of voters per poll worker
or voting machine in polling locations so that wait times are equated across all voters.
In Chapter 2, we perform a differences-in-differences analysis on cross-sectional voter wait
time data across the 2006, 2008, 2012, and 2016 Georgia elections. We estimate that
polling place closures increased Georgia’s average wait time to vote in the 2016 election
by 7 minutes or approximately 78% (based on Georgia’s average wait time of 16.5 minutes
in the 2016 election). This increase in the average wait time to vote suggests that in the
2016 election, Georgia may have idled its spare capacity (e.g., voting machines) following
polling place closures. As a result, we suggest that states implement policies that require
the redistribution of all functioning voting machines from closed polling places or at least
increase transparency in how voting resources are used in elections.
In Chapter 3, we use an instrumental variable estimation and find that patients prefer
v
waiting for endoscopies in pre-op rather than reception. Additional experiments suggest
that pre-op is less favorable due to its intensity (e.g., clinical, emotional). We also find that
in transparent, shared waiting areas where patients do not observe the doctor assignment
of others, patients may still monitor queue discipline. Finally, patients may be negatively
impacted by waits that conclude after a scheduled appointment time but care less about
waits that conclude early. This study emphasizes the importance of businesses managing
queues where customers wait in multiple locations with different attributes.
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CHAPTER 1 : Serving Democracy: Evidence of Voting Resource Disparity in
Florida
Coauthored with Gérard P. Cachon
1.1. Introduction
Given the importance of voting in a democracy, a considerable amount of attention and
study has been applied to how the design of the voting process can influence elections: e.g.,
gerrymandering of district boundaries (Abramowitz (1983); Cain (1985); Chen and Cottrell
(2016); Friedman and Holden (2009)) and voter suppression through voter identification
laws or the service provided by local election officials (Hood III and Bullock III (2012);
Bentele and O’Brien (2013); White et al. (2015); Hajnal et al. (2017); Stein et al. (2019)).
Our study investigates the allocation of voting resources, in particular the number of poll
workers. All else being equal, the more registered voters there are per poll worker, the more
time voters will experience in the voting process (waiting in queue, checking in, and casting
a ballot) (Stein et al. (2019)). Long wait times to vote are not ubiquitous in the United
States, but, depending on the election and location, some voters do experience wait times
of 30 minutes or more (Ansolabehere and Shaw (2016)), the standard set by a Presidential
Commission (Bauer and Ginsberg (2014)). Long waits have been shown to influence choice
in non-voting situations, such as blood donation (Gillespie and Hillyer (2002b)), waiting
in a call center queue (Mandelbaum and Zeltyn (2013)), and grocery shopping (Lu et al.
(2013a)), among others. In the context of voting, theory (Riker and Ordeshook (1968))
and empirical evidence (Alvarez et al. (2008); Cottrell et al. (2017b); Stein et al. (2019))
suggest that long wait times also have the potential to dissuade voters in current and future
elections by raising the actual or perceived cost to vote. This raises the possibility that
one political party could gain an advantage over another if they are able to allocate more
resources towards their likely voters and away from voters who are likely to support the
other side.
In our study, we aim to identify whether there is any disparity in poll worker staffing levels
1
Figure 1: Percent of non-white citizens who voted by state. Data taken from U.S. Census
Bureau reports on the voting and registration for states by race (see https://www.census.
gov/topics/public-sector/voting/data/tables.html). Florida had some counties cov-
ered by the Voting Rights Act which was meant to curb discriminatory voting practices in
certain areas of the country prior to 2013, so its performance is compared to other states
in the South (AL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TX, VA) that had areas covered by the Voting
Rights Act
2
within counties in Florida with respect to race and political party. We focus on Florida
for several reasons: (i) it is viewed as an important state in presidential elections; (ii)
it experienced well-publicized long polling queues in the 2012 election (e.g., Famighetti
et al. (2014)); (iii) it has a checkered past on voting discrimination issues (e.g., Childress
(2014); Klas (2016a); Wood (2016); Hawkins (2018)); (iv) unlike most other states, Florida
provides county-level data that include racial and political party affiliation; and (v) Florida
has lagged behind many of its peer states in terms of minority voter turnout (Fig. 1) and
registration (see Fig. 13)
We study election and demographic data from 2004 to 2016 across all 67 counties in Florida.
Our empirical strategy is to identify the effect of political party and race within Florida
counties across time so as to control for unobserved heterogeneity across counties. To
summarize our results, we find no evidence of a disparity in poll worker staffing directly
due to race. However, we do find that as the percentage of Democrat party voters increases
in a county, the number of registered voters per poll worker also increases, i.e., there are
fewer resources per voter. Our estimates indicate a large and meaningful effect size. Thus,
changes in the composition of political parties across time can lead to larger disparities in
wait times to vote.
1.2. The Voting Process
In Florida, general elections occur every two years with presidential and midterm elections
alternating. All voters in a county registered at least 29 days before an election are allowed
to cast a ballot in an election. On an early voting day (a practice that was mandated in
Florida from 2004) or Election Day, a registered voter who has not voted via an absentee
(or “mail-in”) ballot may go to an early voting site (for early voting) or her assigned polling
place in her precinct (on Election Day) to vote. Based on information from the Florida
Division of Elections, the in-person voting process in Florida includes two primary steps:
check-in and voting.
At the check-in step poll workers ensure voters are registered to vote using a photo identifi-
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cation with a signature (a practice used in Florida from 1998). If a voter is deemed eligible
to vote at the polling place, the voter proceeds to the voting stage. Otherwise, a provisional
ballot may be issued and counted later if voter eligibility is verified. Voting can be done via
an electronic or a paper ballot. To exit the voting process a voter submits the electronic
ballot on a voting machine or processes a paper ballot through an optical scanner.
Queues form at either stage of the voting process whenever the arrival rate of voters exceeds
the rate of service. A number of factors contribute to the queue lengths, such as the overall
level of service capacity, the variability of demand throughout the day, the complexity of the
ballot, and the skill of the poll workers. Although poll workers may be primarily responsible
for check-in, they may also play an important role in voting (e.g., via distributing ballots,
assisting voters with questions on how to use voting equipment, etc.). Hence, the number
of poll workers is a key factor to determine the service experience in elections (Stein et al.
(2019)).
Equity in the voting process has received considerable attention. Some states (but not
Florida) have laws to ensure there is equality among precincts with respect to voting re-
sources. For example, South Carolina requires (but does not strictly enforce) that precincts
not exceed 250 registered voters per voting machine and 500 registered voters per three poll
workers for general elections (Famighetti et al. (2014)). Several studies focus on analytical
methods to assign voting resources with some form of equity across voters as part of the ob-
jective (Allen and Bernshteyn (2006); Yang et al. (2009); Olabisi and Chukwunoso (2012);
Yang et al. (2013)).
There are a number of empirical studies on equality in the voting process (Highton (2006);
Mebane Jr. (2005); Brady and McNulty (2011); Stewart III (2012); Clinton et al. (2019a);
Shepherd et al. (2019)). With respect to Florida, a cross-sectional study of the 2012 general
election finds that minorities faced longer wait times and racial disparities existed in the
distribution of voting resources across precincts (Famighetti et al. (2014)). Cross-sectional
studies are unable to control for unobserved differences across precincts that could influence
4
voter waiting times that are not directly related to race or party affiliation (but may be
correlated with race or party). The limited number of panel data studies on voter-reported
wait times are unable to control for both race and party affiliation (Pettigrew (2017)).
Without data on party affiliation it is not possible to distinguish between a direct racial
bias and one that is due to a group’s leaning towards an opposition party. For example,
non-white voters tend to vote Democrat in the U.S. (Pew Research Center (2016)). Thus,
a bias against Democratic voters would affect non-white voters as well as educated young
white voters (who lean towards the Democratic party according to Pew Research Center
(2015)), whereas a direct racial bias would affect only the former.
1.3. Data and Estimation
We study the 2008 to 2016 elections in Florida but collected data as early as the 2004
election to create lags for certain variables. Our data are from five sources: (1) Election
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) conducted every two years by the U.S. Election
Assistance Commission and collected, typically at the county level, from the 50 States,
the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Territories; (2) the Florida Division of Elections
publishes voter registration statistics for each of its counties in every election; (3) the
U.S. Census Bureau data on annual demographic information on counties; (4) the Verified
Voting Foundation data on voting equipment used across counties; and (5) the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis data on county-level housing prices. (See Section A.4.1 for more
information on the origin of the data.)
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logV otersPerPWi,t =β1PctDemocrati,t + β2PctWhitei,t + β3logV otersPerPWi,t−1+
β4logV otersPerPWi,t−2 + β5logAbsentBallotsPerPPi,t+
β6logEarlyBallotsPerPPi,t + β7logEDBallotsPerPPi,t+
β8logProvBallotsPerPPi,t + β9logPersonPerSqMilei,t+
β10PollDiffi,t + β11HousePricei,t + β12logMedInci,t+
β13UseDREi,t + β14Pct65Plusi,t + β15Presidentialt + β16Timet+
ci + εi,t (1.1)
The proposed regression model is specified in Eq. 1.1. The dependent variable of interest
is logV otersPerPWi,t which is the log of the total number of active registered voters per
poll worker (across both early voting and Election Day) for county i in election year t (t=3
for election year 2008). According to the Florida Division of Elections, inactive (as opposed
to active) registered voters are those who fail “to respond to an address confirmation final
notice and there is no voting or voter registration record activity for two subsequent general
election cycles.” All else equal, a smaller logV otersPerPWi,t should be better for voters,
i.e., lead to a shorter time to vote.
Our main regressors of interest are PctDemocrati,t and PctWhitei,t. PctDemocrati,t is
the percentage of active registered voters who identified as Democrat in county i in election
year t. In Florida voters have an incentive to keep their political party affiliation up-to-date
because only members of a party can vote in the party’s primary. Over the time of our study,
Florida consistently had a higher number of counties vote Republican in the presidential or
gubernatorial elections. PctWhitei,t is the percentage of active registered voters in county
i who identified as white in the election year t.
PctDemocrati,t and PctWhitei,t act as controls for each other because (as discussed) non-
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white voters tend to vote Democrat in the U.S., but some white voters (younger and more
educated) do as well. If some counties become relatively more Democratic while also de-
creasing their relative percentage of non-white voters, then including only one variable may
not be able to identify the effects of interest.
During the time period in our sample, PctWhitei,t is decreasing on average, while
logV otersPerPWi,t is on average increasing (see Table 1). All counties had a negative
linear trend for PctDemocrati,t and the average across counties decreased over the time
period (see Table 1).
Table 1: Mean values of key variables across Florida’s 67 counties within each general
election.
Variable 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016
VotersPerPW 178.63 217.85 238.21 277.54 265.94
PctDemocrat 48.61 46.95 44.43 42.74 39.58
PctWhite 79.65 79.36 78.44 77.98 77.12
AbsentBallotsPerPP 270.33 182.56 387.29 314.01 447.01
EarlyBallotsPerPP 419.76 199.37 473.86 261.75 678.69
EDBallotsPerPP 530.26 480.01 620.79 523.51 548.87
ProvBallotsPerPP 4.00 1.87 6.42 1.98 3.90
PollDiff 3.07 3.21 3.37 3.39 4.00
PersonPerSqMile 339.77 338.23 342.46 349.71 360.72
HousePrice 174.30 132.69 119.34 132.22 152.62
MedInc 43959 44269 43876 43908 45205
UseDRE 0.94 0.82 0.78 0.70 0.36
Pct65Plus 17.17 17.56 18.26 19.21 20.32
*Values calculated based on one imputation for the variable
Included in Eq. 1.1 is a number of controls. Poll staffing should depend on forecasted
demand in an election, both in the total number of voters (presidential election years have
higher demand) and how votes are cast (early voting may require different staffing than
Election Day voting). How votes are cast (paper vs. electronic, early vs. on-the-day)
may be linked to party or race (e.g., if Democrats prefer early voting). We use two sets
of proxies for these forecasts. The first set of proxies for an election’s forecasted demand
is the staffing used in the previous elections of the same county: we include two lags,
logV otersPerPWi,t−1 and logV otersPerPWi,t−2 as controls. The second set of proxies
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relate to contemporaneous election turnout. Because staffing is done at the level of a
polling place, in all cases we evaluate the turnout proxies as the ratio of the actual ballots
in a county to the number of polling places in the county. logAbsentBallotsPerPPi,t is the
log of the number of absentee ballots cast per polling place. Absentee ballots (also known
as mail-in ballots) should represent a lighter workload per ballot cast for election workers,
i.e., a positive β5. logEarlyBallotsPerPPi,t is the log of the early voting ballots cast per
polling place. Given that early voting occurs over multiple days and that voters physically
cast a ballot just as they do during Election Day, we expect an increase in the early ballots
cast per polling place to decrease logV otersPerPW because more poll workers are needed
over multiple days to service early voters, i.e., a negative β6. logEDBallotsPerPPi,t is the
log of the Election Day ballots cast per polling place. We expect increases in Election Day
ballots cast per polling place to increase logV otersPerPW because more of the demand
for poll workers is concentrated on just one day, i.e., positive β7. logProvBallotsPerPPi,t
is the log of the provisional ballots cast per polling place (with one added in case a county
reports zero provisional ballots). Although provisional ballots may not represent a large
portion of total votes cast (less than 0.5% of total ballots cast from 2008 to 2016 in our
sample), they can require a significant amount of work (Dixon (2012)), i.e., a negative β8.
Staffing could depend on the difficulty to recruit poll workers (Burden and Milyo (2015)),
which is a concern if this is linked to race or political party. In the EAVS, counties rate
poll worker recruitment difficulty on a scale from 1 (very difficult) to 5 (very easy) for each
election, which we include as the control PollDiffi,t in Eq. 1.1. For this variable there
are four out of 67 counties missing data for 2014 and 30 out of 67 counties missing data
for 2016. We use multiple imputation to account for the missing data values (see Section
A.1.2).
Race and party affiliation is correlated with where a person lives (Parker et al. (2018)). The
variability of demand throughout the day may depend on a precinct’s degree of urbanization,
and that variability may influence staffing. For example, an area with greater morning and
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evening demand spikes should require more staffing to achieve the same waiting time. We
control for any effects of urban versus rural by including in Eq. 1.1 the log of the number
of people per square mile in a county, logPersonPerSqMilei,t.
We include in Eq. 1.1 the log of the median income of a county, logMedInci,t, and the
“All-Transactions House Price Index”, HousePricei,t (normalized at a value of 100 in the
year 2000) to control for differences in staffing that could be related to the wealth of a
county over time (Spencer and Markovits (2010)).
To control for voter age, which may influence the time a voter needs to cast a ballot (Glenn
and Grimes (1968)), we use the U.S. Census estimate of the percentage of the population
within each county that is above the age of 65 (Pct65Plusi,t).
The method of voting may influence the needed capacity (Spencer and Markovits (2010)).
From 2008 to 2016, many Florida counties switched from direct recording electronics (DREs)
machines to paper ballots (see Fig. 14). We set UseDREi,t to 1 if a county used any DRE
equipment in an election, otherwise it defaults to 0. The Verified Voting Foundation does
not provide data on voting equipment for Florida counties in 2010, so we use multiple
imputation to account for this missing year (see Section A.1.2).
To account for variation in interest across elections, we included a dummy variable,
Presidentialt, to indicate whether the election year was a presidential election. We in-
clude a linear time trend in the dependent variable across all counties, Timet to control for
statewide time dependent trends. For example, from Table 1, the total number of active
registered voters per poll worker tends to rise across counties during the span of our study.
Table 21 provides summary statistics for all key variables across all Florida counties and
elections.
The regression in Eq. 1.1 includes county fixed effects, ci, to control for unobserved hetero-
geneity across counties that does not vary across time yet influences the staffing level. The
presence of fixed effects in Eq. 1.1 along with the lagged dependent variables and regressors
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raises a concern of endogeneity bias in its estimation (Nickell (1981)). We use Arellano
and Bond (1991) dynamic panel data model with first differences and lagged variables as
instruments to overcome this issue. We limit the number of lags used as instruments in the
model (Bowsher (2002)). To be specific, for the voting resource regressors (logVotersPerPW,
logAbsentBallotsPerPP, logEarlyBallotsPerPP, logEDBallotsPerPP, logProvBallotsPerPP)
we use the second and third lags as instruments (corresponding to both a midterm and
presidential election). For voter demographic variables (PctDemocrat, PctWhite), we use
the second election lag as an instrument, and for poll worker recruitment difficulty (PollD-
iff ), we use the most recent election lag as an instrument. We do not include lags of the
other regressors (logPersonPerSqMile, HousePrice, MedInc, UseDRE, Pct65Plus) because
we believe they should be uncorrelated with shocks to the number of voters or poll workers.
The Hansen test (robust to heteroscedasticity) for overidentifying restrictions assumes a
null hypothesis that our instruments meet the exogeneity requirement. We do not find
evidence that the exogeneity assumption is violated (Table 13). We also address two issues
with Arellano-Bond estimation. First, it may perform poorly if instruments are weak,
which could occur if changes in county election demographics were fully adjustable from
one election to the next, thereby having no relation to past values. We believe, however,
that county demographics are somewhat rigid over time. Consistent with that view, we do
not find evidence of weakness using F-statistics from the first-stage 2SLS regressions of the
first differences of each endogenous variable (pooled across counties and election years) on
its lagged instrument(s) (see Table 14). Second, Arellano-Bond estimation requires serially
uncorrelated errors, which is supported (Table 13)
1.4. Results
As shown in Fig. 2, our results provide support for a disparity in voting resources due to
political party. (See Table 15 for our complete set of estimates.) For a base reference, Fig. 2,
Left provides the fixed effects estimates from a model without instruments for endogenous
regressors. Fig. 2, Middle and Right provide the estimates from our preferred models,
the one-step and the two-step Arellano-Bond procedures, respectively. All three models
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indicate that the number of voters per poll worker increases as a county’s percentage of
Democrat voters increases. In particular, based on the two-step Arellano-Bond procedure
(Fig. 2, Right), a one percent increase in the percentage of Democrat voters is associated
with a 2.8% increase in voters per poll worker. This effect appears to be large - as a point of
comparison, in a cross-sectional study of voter resource allocation in Florida’s 2012 election,
a one percent increase in the percentage of white voters is associated with an increase of
0.26% voters per poll worker on Election Day (Famighetti et al. (2014)). (See Section A.1.3
for more details on this benchmark calculation.)
In contrast to prior studies (Pettigrew (2017); Famighetti et al. (2014)), our results do not
support the existence of a racial bias: the coefficients on PctWhite in both the one-step and
two-step Arellano-Bond procedures are not significant. However, those studies are unable
to control for political party affiliation. Given that race and political party are correlated,
it is possible to conflate racial bias with a political party bias.
We estimate additional models (using the two-step Arellano-Bond procedure) to check the
robustness of our results. In particular, we include different time controls, we utilize fewer
instruments and lagged variables, we control for voters with no party affiliation, we control
for the 2013 Supreme Court decision Shelby County v. Holder which influenced some of the
counties in Florida during our study period, and we substitute our contemporaneous forecast
turnout proxies with lagged variables. In all of these models the results are qualitatively
similar to our main findings: there is a significant and negative coefficient for PctDemocrat
and an insignificant effect of PctWhite (see Section A.1.4 and Tables 16 to 18 for descriptions
of the robustness checks, results, specification tests, and weak instrument tests).
1.5. Simulation
We use a queue simulation tool, developed by Mark Pelczarski, to examine the impact
that changing the number of voters per poll worker could have on the wait time to vote
(see https://web.mit.edu/vtp/calc3.htm for more information on the tool). This tool
simulates the wait times voters could experience during a voting day based on queueing
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Figure 2: Displayed are coefficients from the regressions that estimate Eq. 1.1. Bars
represent the 95% confidence intervals with robust standard errors used for the fixed effects
and one-step estimation and Windmeijer corrected standard errors used for the two-step
estimation (Windmeijer (2005))
.
theory, historical data on polling places, and user-customized inputs on voter demand, voter
arrival variability, and polling place capacity. We calibrate the simulation using data from
the 2012 election in Florida because data are available on voter resource levels (Famighetti
et al. (2014)) and the average voter wait time (Stewart III (2015)).
Table 19 reports the parameters selected for our base simulation. For the 2012 election
in Florida, the average reported wait time is 42.3 minutes (Stewart III (2015)) and the
average number of ballots cast per polling place on Election Day is 620.8 (EAVS). For our
base simulation we selected 675 voters, 2 check-in machines, and 4 voting machines because
the simulation tool with those parameters yields an average wait time of 40 minutes and
619 votes cast, similar to the actual results.
The simulation tool uses check-in stations and voting machines as the inputted resources.
Our estimates focus on poll worker capacity. To make the linkage between our results and
the simulation, we presume that voting resources are assigned proportionally. For example,
it makes little sense to have three check-in stations and only one poll worker (or, with the
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other extreme, 6 poll workers).
We use three different methods to adjust capacity to measure the impact of a change in the
percentage of Democrats on the average wait time. The first adjusts the average number
of check-in stations in response to changes in PctDemocrat, leaving all other parameters
constant, and assuming that the average change in check-in stations per polling place is
proportional to our estimate for the average change in poll workers per polling place. (See
Section A.1.5 for details.) The second method is analogous to the first except now the
number of voting stations is reduced. The third method increases the number of voters per
polling place holding voting resources constant
Figure 3: Estimated average wait time in a county resulting from increases in PctDemocrat
using three different methods for adjusting capacity.
Fig. 3 reports the change in wait times as a function of the increase in PctDemocrat. The
three methods provide comparable results. For example, a 5% increase in PctDemocrat
raises the average wait time in a county from an initial 40 minutes to between 100 and
111 minutes. Our wait time estimate seems realistic given that a 5% increase in PctDemo-
crat is 1.30 times the within-county standard deviation from 2008 to 2016 (3.85%), and
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Table 2: Wait time (average of the three methods to adjust capacity) in a county resulting
from changes in PctDemocrat predicted by changes in PctWhite (controlling for Presidential,
Time, and county fixed effects between 2008 and 2016).




the resulting average wait times are between 1.06 and 1.23 standard deviations above the
average wait time reported by voters in Florida in the 2012 election across the Cooperative
Congressional Election Study (Ansolabehere and Schaffner (2013)) and the Survey of the
Performance of American Elections (Stewart (2013)).
Our study suggests that there may be no direct effect of race on voting resources and voter
wait times. However, because race and political party are correlated, indirect effects of race
could exist without controlling for political party. For example, when we regress PctDemo-
crat on PctWhite, controlling for Presidential, Time, and county fixed effects between 2008
and 2016, we find that a 1% decrease in PctWhite is associated with a 1.28% increase in
PctDemocrat. Table 2 suggests that race could appear to drive voter wait times if political
party is not observed.
1.6. Conclusion
Ensuring there is no disparity in voting resources among voters of different races or political
party is an important endeavor. Ours is the first panel data study of voting resource
disparities in elections. Unlike previous studies, we do not find a disparity with respect
to race, per se. Instead, we provide evidence that as the percentage of Democrat voters
in a Florida county increases, the voters in that county experience lower staffing levels
(through more voters per poll worker) and longer waits to vote (via our simulation findings).
Furthermore, our effect size estimates appear to be meaningful.
Rather than racial animosity, our results are consistent with parties using the allocation
of voting resources to their advantage in the hope to dissuade voters from the opposition
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party from voting: the likelihood of a potential voter actually voting surely is different if
the expected wait time is 100 minutes rather than 40 minutes. However, we are not able to
rule out all possible explanations for the observed disparity. For example, if non-Democrats
experience higher waiting costs per unit of time than Democrats, then a benevolent social
planner would choose to bias resources away from Democrats: the unobserved cost of waiting
can be equal even if the actual waits differ. Alternatively, if Democrats require less time to
complete a ballot (or have lower variance in completion times), then equating waiting times
would require different levels of resources per voter. If each poll worker is assigned more
hours, as a county becomes more Democratic, then the reduction in poll workers might not
imply a reduction in the total work hours dedicated to voting: i.e., fewer workers working
more hours could yield a constant total resource level. Finally, unbalanced resources could
be socially optimal if Democrats arrive to the polls more consistently throughout the day
than non-Democrats. Although these hypotheses are potentially testable, they do not strike
us as plausible.
We do emphasize that while our data indicates a resource bias based on political party, this
bias does deferentially impact racial groups due to their varying support for the political
parties. To the extent that non-white voters lean towards the Democratic party, they are
more likely to be adversely affected.
While there are media stories regarding long waits to vote, there has not been reports that
precincts have explicitly reduced voting resources. However there is reason to believe that
such bias can occur and also be hard to detect. If the overall voting population is growing
(as it was during our study period in Florida) but resources were not proportionally added,
then Democratic leaning districts could be disadvantaged merely by keeping their resources
constant without the need to explicitly have them reduced. They are only reduced relative
to the demand they have to serve, which is less visible. Furthermore, voting resource
allocations across polling places suffers from consequential integer constraints - the difference
between one and two check-in stations can be significant. Thus, the one area that gets the
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additional resource is given a significant benefit relative to those in which resources are
maintained at the status quo.
Given our findings, a practical solution is for a state to regulate the amount of resources
in each polling location so as to attempt to equate waiting times across all voters. Unlike
Florida, some states, such as South Carolina, have laws which mandate a maximum num-
ber of voters per voting resource. Although many laws related to the voting process are
controversial (e.g., voter identification laws), laws that ensure democracy is equally served
across all citizens should be less contentious.
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CHAPTER 2 : Democracy on the Line: Polling Place Closures and the Impact on
Wait Times in the 2016 Presidential Election in Georgia
Coauthored with Gérard P. Cachon
2.1. Introduction
In the 2013 Shelby County v. Holder case, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided that Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act was unconstitutional. This provision qualified
certain areas of the country with a history of voter discrimination, including the state of
Georgia, to gain approval from the U.S. Department of Justice for any changes in the voting
process under Section 5 (The Brennan Center for Justice (2019); The United States De-
partment of Justice (2019a,b)). Following the ruling, the office of the Secretary of State for
Georgia sent a memo to local election officials in February 2015 to promote the consolidation
of polling places (The Leadership Conference Education Fund (2019)).
Research on polling place closures (and changes) has focused on the impact of closures on
turnout. A reduction in the number of polling locations increases the average distance voters
need to travel to vote. That increases the cost to vote, which theory suggests should reduce
turnout (Riker and Ordeshook (1968)). Empirical evidence generally supports a negative
impact on voting (Haspel and Knotts (2005); Brady and McNulty (2011); Cantoni (2016);
Yoder (2019)). However, there is evidence of mitigating factors: some voters are willing
to substitute in-person election day voting with other voting methods, such as absentee
ballot or early voting; and the mere notification (generally through postal mail) of a voting
location change can prompt some to vote (Clinton et al. (2019b)).
Instead of turnout, our interest is on the impact of polling place closures on the wait time to
vote. Research in settings such as healthcare (Camacho et al. (2006); Gillespie and Hillyer
(2002a); Batt and Terwiesch (2015)), retail (Davis and Vollmann (1990); Allon et al. (2011)),
and transportation (Taylor (1994)) has shown that time waiting is disliked and costly to
businesses and customers. Long lines at the polls have the potential to disenfranchise
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Figure 4: Mechanisms through which polling place closures may impact voter wait times
voters in an election, which can influence the decision to vote: from a survey on the 2008
U.S. election, an estimated 11.1% of voters did not vote because of long lines (Alvarez et al.
(2008)). Beyond a contemporaneous effect, waiting could dissuade voters from participating
in future elections: in Florida, evidence shows that voters who experienced longer waits in
the 2012 election had a lower probability of voting in the next presidential election (Cottrell
et al. (2017a)). A number of studies document voter wait time disparities related to factors
such as race, political party, and income (Highton (2006); Stewart III (2012); Famighetti
et al. (2014); Pettigrew (2017)), and others have linked those differences to unbalanced
allocation of voting resources such as poll workers and voting machines (Famighetti et al.
(2014); Pettigrew (2017); Cachon and Kaaua (2019)). Our empirical research focuses on
how polling place closures in Georgia may have impacted voter wait times in the 2016
election.
From queuing theory (Kleinrock (1975)), the time to vote depends on the characteristics of
demand (e.g., turnout, volatility throughout the day, etc.) and capacity (e.g., number of
poll workers, voting machines, etc.) Presuming that polling place closures reduce turnout,
all else being equal (e.g., capacity), voter waiting times should be reduced, as shown by the
top mechanism in Fig.4 - if fewer voters arrive to the polls, then the lower burden on the
system should reduce the time each voter waits to vote.
Unlike voter turnout, the impact of polling place closures on voter wait times is ambiguous
18
with respect to capacity, the lower mechanism in Fig.4. A critical question is how county
administrators manage the capacity of the closed polling locations. A natural option, as
appears to have been done in Texas (Simpson (2016)), is to take the resources from closed
locations and redistribute them proportionally to the remaining locations. (See Allen and
Bernshteyn (2006); Yang et al. (2009, 2013) for analytical methods to allocate capacity
across locations.) That approach, which we refer to as ”capacity pooling,” continues to
utilize all resources, just in fewer locations. Supported by theory (Cachon and Terwiesch
(2013)), but contrary to popular opinion in the media (The Leadership Conference Educa-
tion Fund (2019)), capacity pooling should reduce voter wait time (holding all else constant,
such as demand). This occurs because capacity pooling mitigates the primary inefficiency
associated with multiple locations, the possibility that resources are idle at some locations
while voters are waiting at other locations.
Capacity pooling is not the only option for managing resources. The capacity in closed
polling locations could be distributed to a select few of the remaining locations. Voters in
those lucky locations would experience an improvement, but voters in the other locations
could experience a degradation in service. Due to the non-linearity in the response of wait
time to capacity in queuing systems, the overall net effect of this imbalanced redistribution
of capacity could be negative (Kleinrock (1975)). The least beneficial of approaches is
merely to mothball or cancel the capacity from resources of the closed polling locations,
leaving the remaining locations with the same capacity but more voters. A state might
take this approach if it has the (real or stated) motivation to reduce the overall budget for
conducting an election. In fact, there is some evidence that Georgia indeed took some of
its existing capacity out of service in the 2018 general election (Niesse (2018)). Such an
approach leads polling closures to cause an increase in voter wait time, as shown in Fig.4.
In sum, our goal is to estimate how polling place closures in Georgia after the Shelby County
v. Holder decision impacted waiting time for voters in Georgia in the 2016 election. Given
the existence of multiple mechanisms, we use a difference-in-difference methodology and
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control for the impact of polling place closures on voter turnout (i.e., the top mechanism in
Fig.4). We find that voters in Georgia in the 2016 presidential election experienced a 78%
increase in the average wait time to vote, or about 7.2 minutes based on Georgia’s average
wait time of 16.5 minutes in the 2016 election. This finding is inconsistent with the use of a
capacity pooling strategy (redistributing voting resources to remaining locations). Instead,
it is consistent with a strategy that combines polling place closures with a reduction in
capacity, possibly by mothballing the capacity of the closed locations, thereby imposing on
voters greater costs both through the distance needed to travel and the time waiting to
vote.
2.2. Methodology and Data
We use a difference-in-difference (DD) methodology to examine the effect of polling place
closures, following Shelby County v. Holder, on wait times in Georgia in the 2016 election.
Given that polling place closures were motivated by the office of the Secretary of State
of Georgia, we take the entire state of Georgia as our treatment group. It is important to
confirm that the state was actually treated with polling place closures between the 2012 and
2016 elections. Georgia reported the number of polling places in the state to the Election
Administration and Voting Survey (EAVS) in 2006 and every two years afterwards, with
the exception of 2012 (see Table 20). VICE News (Arthur and McCann (2018)) conducted a
survey of all 159 counties to estimate the magnitude of polling place closures in Georgia and
found that among the 84 that reported, the total number of polling places declined by 7.48%
between the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections. We view that estimate as a lower bound
because of potential reporting bias: counties that closed a substantial number of polling
places may be less likely to respond to an informal survey. To provide another measure
of closures, we define the imputed number of polling places in 2012 as ̂PollP laces2012 and
estimate it using Eq.2.1, which accounts for differences in turnout across elections (Fig.5)
and expected growth. We find ̂PollP laces2012 = 3, 159, which suggests there was a 13.90%
decline in the number of polling places from 2012 to 2016 in Georgia. We conclude that
Georgia was indeed treated with polling place closures.
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Figure 5: Voter turnout in Georgia and South Carolina by election year
̂PollP laces2012 = max {PollP laces2010, PollP laces2014}×
PollP laces2008/max {PollP laces2006, PollP laces2010}
(2.1)
The DD method requires a control for the treated sample. We propose South Carolina as a
control for Georgia in the DD for several reasons. First, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
fully covered both Georgia and South Carolina prior to 2013. However, while the Shelby
County v. Holder ruling allowed both states to close polling places without Department
of Justice approval, state regulations in South Carolina discouraged closures in the state
(The Leadership Conference Education Fund (2019)). Consequently, the total number of
polling places in South Carolina (see Fig.6) remained relatively unchanged over the period
of interest, increasing by just 0.91% between the 2012 and 2016 elections (according to the
EAVS). Second, South Carolina is situated adjacent to Georgia in the Southern United
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Figure 6: Total polling places in Georgia and South Carolina across the 2006, 2008, 2012,
and 2016 elections using ̂PollP laces2012 for Georgia in 2012
States. States close in distance may be more likely to share similar characteristics (e.g.,
Card and Krueger (1994)). For example, Georgia and South Carolina may have similar
voting cultures (as evidenced by each state’s complete coverage under the Voting Rights
Act prior to 2013) and Election Day weather which can impact voter behavior. Third,
at least as early as 2006, according to the Verified Voting Foundation, Georgia and South
Carolina use, throughout the entire state, direct-recording electronic (DRE) voting machines
(rather than paper ballots for example) (See https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.
org/about-vvf/ for more information on the Verified Voting Foundation.) Voting times on
DREs can differ substantially from voting times on paper ballots within the same election
(Stewart III (2015)), but that is not a concern in our study.
Eq.2.2 provides the specification for the DD estimation. logWaiti is the log of the wait time
in minutes reported by voter i in the 2006, 2008, 2012, or 2016 Cooperative Congressional
Election Study (CCES) in response to the question Approximately how long did you wait
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in line to vote. (Data were not collected for this question in 2010). CCES samples from
a 50,000+ pool of adults of which only a fraction vote. CCES is distributed nationwide
proportional to the population. Respondents were allowed to choose from the following
options: Not at all, Less than 10 minutes, 10 to 30 minutes, 31 to 60 minutes, and More
than 1 hour. We coded the ranges as: Not at all - 1 minute, Less than 10 minutes - 5 minutes,
10 to 30 minutes - 20 minutes, and 31 to 60 minutes - 45 minutes. Respondents input custom
times when the wait was more than one hour so these were manually coded. Because we
are analyzing categorical, voter-reported wait times, there is an issue of measurement error,
but we do not believe that measurement error in Georgia or South Carolina should be
systematically different in either of the states during the elections we study.
logWaiti =β0 + β1Treatedi + β2Election2006i + β3Election2008i + β4Election2016i+
β5(Treatedi × Election2006i) + β6(Treatedi × Election2008i)+




Treatedi is a dummy variable that equals one if voter i is located in Georgia where polling
place closures occurred and zero if located in the control state, South Carolina, where polling
place closures were prevented. Election2006i, Election2008i, and Election2016i are dummy
variables that equal one in the specified election year and zero otherwise. Election2006,
Election2008, and the excluded base election year 2012 are the pre-treatment elections while
Election2016 is the post-treatment election. (We ignored the 2010 pre-treatment election
due to the data constraint described above.) X
′
i is the vector of controls. εi is the error
term, and we cluster these errors by county since county officials are primarily responsible
for managing elections in each state (Georgia counties each have a Board of Elections, and
South Carolina counties each have a Board of Voter Registration and Elections). β7 is
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Figure 7: Average wait times (minutes) for Georgia and South Carolina in the 2006, 2008,
2012, and 2016 elections
therefore our DD estimate of the impact polling place closures had on wait times in Georgia
in the 2016 election. Section A.4.1 has more information on the origin of the data used in
this study.
If South Carolina is a valid control for Georgia in the DD estimation, its wait times, con-
ditional on the regressors in Eq.2.2, should follow a parallel trend from 2006 to 2012 (i.e.,
before the Shelby County v. Holder ruling). Unconditional on any other variables, this
appears to be visually confirmed in Fig.7. To perform the parallel trend assumption test
statistically, however, the estimates for β5 and β6 in Eq.2.2 should not be statistically sig-
nificant, suggesting there is a constant difference (or parallel trend) between Georgia and
South Carolina’s conditional wait times before treatment.
We include in Eq.2.2 several controls related to three main factors that influence wait times
in elections: voter arrival variability, polling place capacity, and the overall demand to vote.
(See Table 21 for a numerical summary of all controls).
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Urban polling places may have more consistent voter arrivals throughout the day than rural
polling places because residents in rural areas may have less access to their polling places
throughout the workday. This could cause an arrival pattern in rural areas with larger
spikes in demand throughout Election Day. Due to this potential rural versus urban effect,
we include the control logPplPerSqMi, which is the log of the number of residents per square
mile in voter i’s county in the voter’s election year.
We include several controls related to polling place capacity. In the United States, elec-
tions tend to be funded by counties, and as of 2018, the National Conference of State
Legislator suggested that Georgia and South Carolina counties primarily funded general
elections in the state (see http://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
election-costs.aspx). We have no reason to believe that this funding model was not the
same over the duration of our study. Thus, we include logIncome, which is the log of the
median income in voter i’s county and election year. We include Pct65Plus, the percentage
of residents in voter i’s county and election year who are 65 years or older, because coun-
ties with higher percentages of older voters may face different capacity constraints (Glenn
and Grimes (1968)). Given the evidence that polling place capacity could be affected by
the racial or political party composition of voters within various jurisdictions (Famighetti
et al. (2014); Pettigrew (2017); Cachon and Kaaua (2019)), we include two related controls.
PctWhite is the percentage of white registered voters in voter i’s county and election year.
Georgia and South Carolina do not ask voters for political party affiliation on their voter
registration forms and both states hold open primaries, but we still control for potential
political party bias using a proxy for political party affiliation within a county. PctDem is
the percentage of voters in voter i’s county who voted for the Democratic gubernatorial or
presidential candidate in the previous election (relative to the voter i’s election year).
The overall demand to vote is driven by two factors: the number of registered voters and
the turnout percent of those registered voters. In Eq.2.2, we include controls related to
the overall demand to vote. RegV oters is the total number of active registered voters
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in voter i’s county and election year. We also include the squared term of this variable
(i.e., RegV oters2) to account for the fact that wait times may increase exponentially at
higher levels of voter demand. Turnout is the percentage of voters who turned out to vote
in voter i’s county and election year. EDTurnout is the turnout specifically on Election
Day and is the total number of Election Day ballots cast divided by the total number of
active registered voters in voter i’s county and election year. RegV oters, Turnout, and
EDTurnout also control for key legislative changes that occurred in Georgia and South
Carolina over the time of our study which may have impacted the general demand to vote.
Brennan Center for Justice listed the key voting restrictions states have implemented in
the recent past (Weiser and Feldman (2018)), and they are shown verbatim for Georgia
and South Carolina in Table 22. In 2006, the state of Georgia attempted to enact a law
that would have required voters to present photo identification to vote. This law was
blocked for the 2006 election but was upheld in 2007 (see https://www.brennancenter.
org/legal-work/common-causegeorgia-v-billups). This legislative change may have
reduced voter turnout, so Turnout, and EDTurnout should control for its effect.
In 2009, Georgia required voter registration applicants to provide documents proving citi-
zenship. This more stringent voter registration requirement could have reduced the pool of
registered voters. Therefore, RegV oters should control for this law’s effects.
Before the 2010 election, Georgia implemented a law shortening the number of early voting
days. This legislative change may have reduced voter turnout in general and shifted more
voting demand to Election Day. Turnout and EDTurnout should control for the effect of
this change.
In South Carolina v. Holder, plaintiffs aimed to block a South Carolina law (proposed to the
U.S. Department of Justice for approval in 2011) requiring voters to have photo identification
to vote. (See https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/south-carolina-v-holder
for more information on South Carolina v. Holder.) The law was not implemented in the
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2012 election and voters were still able to use a non-photo voter registration card in future
elections. Although we believe that this law should not have had a significant impact on
voter turnout in the 2016 election, we still control for the change in legislation with Turnout,
and EDTurnout.
From 2013 until two months before the 2016 election, Georgia implemented a “no match,
no vote” policy and did not process voter registrations for applicants who did not have in-
formation on the application matching information in the state’s databases (J.E.F. (2018)).
During that time, thousands of voter registration applications were not processed which
could have reduced the number of registered voters for the 2016 election. RegV oters should
control for this policy’s effects.
Fig.7 shows that the average wait time for South Carolina decreased from 2012 to 2016,
while the wait time for Georgia slightly increased over the same time period. This suggests
that polling place closures in Georgia resulted in an increase in wait times in the 2016
election. However, the figure shows unconditional wait times. More convincing evidence is
a positive and statistically significant estimate for β7 in Eq.2.2, which would indicate that
the increase in wait times in Georgia is associated with polling place closures. An increase
(given the controls for turnout and others), would suggest that Georgia did not implement
a capacity pooling strategy, i.e., polling place closures occurred with a reduction in overall
capacity, either because the freed capacity was redistributed unevenly, or mothballed, or
both.
2.3. Results and Robustness Checks
Using ordinary least squares regression, we estimated the DD specification in Eq.2.2, and
the results are displayed in Fig.8 and Table 23. We first note that there is evidence that the
parallel trends assumption is satisfied in our regression with insignificant, small coefficients
on (Treated × Election2006) and (Treated × Election2008). In Fig.8, we see that the
difference in logWait for Georgia and South Carolina (i.e., the treatment effect), conditional
on all other regressors, looks statistically identical in 2006, 2008, and 2012, suggesting a
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Figure 8: Treatment effect in election i (where i = 2006, 2008, 2016) minus the treatment
effect in the 2012 election
parallel trend. We therefore assume that South Carolina is a good control for Georgia.
Our results show a statistically significant DD estimate of β7 = 0.578, and Fig.8 displays the
confidence interval around the treatment effect. According to this estimate, the average wait
time in Georgia in 2016 was 1 − e0.578 = 78% higher due to polling place closures. From
the CCES data, the average wait time in Georgia in 2016 was 16.5 minutes, suggesting
that the increase in wait time resulting from polling place closures was about 7.2 minutes
(16.5− 16.5/1.78). In addition, we believe that this result may be a conservative estimate
given that we include in our analysis all counties in Georgia rather than focusing only on
counties that closed polling places (due to limitations in the data discussed above to identify
these counties).
An increase in average wait time in the 2016 election is not consistent with the implementa-
tion of a capacity pooling strategy, which would predict a reduction in average wait times.
Instead, the increase in the time to vote in Georgia is consistent with administrators who
either reallocated the capacity and resources from closed polling locations to a limited set
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of the maintained locations, or more likely, a reduction in the overall voting resources in the
state. Therefore, polling place closures in Georgia in the 2016 election may have not only
disenfranchised voters due to the longer average distances needed to travel to vote, but also
due to the longer wait times once at the polling places.
We performed five robustness checks to support our results, and they are described below.
The results in Fig.8 and Table 23 show that all passed the parallel trends test and had
similar results to the base regression’s DD estimator.
(1) CCES/SPAE: We combine the CCES wait data with data from the Survey of the
Performance of American Elections (SPAE). Each survey requests voters to estimate their
wait times using the same question (although the sampling methodology differs). Initiated
in 2008, SPAE samples 200 registered voters in each state of which a fraction vote, and
it is distributed within states proportional to the population (see https://dataverse.
harvard.edu/dataverse/SPAE). See Table 24 for the number of wait time observations in
the CCES and SPAE surveys in each election.
(2) Presidential: In Eq.2.2, we calculate the DD estimate for a presidential election year
(2016) using a midterm election (2006) in the pre-treatment period. Presidential elections
tend to have higher turnout relative to midterm elections (see Fig.5), and states have more
of an incentive to maximize voter capacity in presidential elections. Therefore, voter wait
times across Georgia and South Carolina may follow more uniform pre-treatment trends
across presidential elections and provide a more accurate estimate of the treatment effect
in the 2016 election. We therefore remove Election2006 and (Treated×Election2006) from
Eq.2.2 and perform our DD estimation on observations from the 2008, 2012, and 2016
elections.
(3) IndControls: In the base regression, all controls are at the county level. We therefore
add additional controls to Eq.2.2 specific to each respondent in the CCES survey. The
controls are as follows: whether the respondent identified as white (White); whether the
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respondent identified as male (Male); age of the respondent at the time of the Election
(Age); whether the respondent identified as a Democrat (Dem); whether the respondent
identified as an Independent (Ind); whether the respondent’s family income was $100,000
or more (HighInc); whether the respondent had some college education but not necessarily
a college degree (College). See Table 25 for summary statistics on all the individual-level
controls.
(4) VICEClosures: Because Georgia did not report any polling place counts for EAVS in
2012, we conduct a robustness check only on those counties which VICE News (Arthur and
McCann (2018)) found to have closed polling places between 2012 and 2016. We therefore
exclude all observations from Georgia counties that did not meet this criteria.
(5) CountyFE: To control for any potential county fixed effects, we add dummy variables
for each voter’s county to Eq.2.2.
2.4. Discussion and Conclusion
We find that polling place closures substantially increased wait times in Georgia in the
2016 election. In addition, our result suggests that the state did not pursue a capacity
pooling strategy and probably had a significant amount of voting resources that were idle
or reduced during the election. When this result is coupled with the fact that voters in
Georgia may have needed to travel longer distances to vote due to polling place closures,
voter disenfranchisement becomes a twofold concern. Moreover, the poor service experience
voters may have had in the 2016 election due to polling place closures could have discouraged
them from voting in the 2018 election (e.g. Cottrell et al. (2017a))
Evidence suggests that the Georgia Secretary of State’s office (which was under Republican
leadership at the time) promoted ”consolidation” to all local election officials, and counties
with specific demographics (e.g., those with more minority voters) were not explicitly tar-
geted. However, polling place closure strategies are likely to be more attractive in poorer
counties where election budgets may be tighter and voters may be less likely to protest
such changes (Mohai and Saha (2015)). In addition, following polling place closures, poorer
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counties may find a non-pooling strategy attractive given that a pooling strategy incurs
larger administrative costs associated with finding new polling places (that can accommo-
date more voting machines) and larger labor costs (i.e., more poll workers).
We conducted a county-level analysis (see Section A.4.2 and Table 27) to identify the
characteristics of the counties we were able to confirm closed polling locations before the
2016 election (relative to the 2008 presidential election). Racial composition of voters and
political party measures do not predict the counties with closures. Instead, we find that
a county’s average income is the only significant (p<0.05) predictor of closures between
the two elections (see Table 27). If Democrats tend to be over-represented among lower
income voters (Pew Research Center (2016)), then promoting polling place closures without
encouraging capacity pooling could help Republicans overall. Furthermore, if Democrats
are more sensitive than Republicans to voting costs (Brady and McNulty (2011)) such as
wait times at the polls (e.g., due to the lost income associated with voting relative to overall
wealth), then Republicans could gain an advantage through longer wait times to vote even
if polling place closures occurred randomly across the state. In other words, a party could
gain an advantage from a policy that encourages fewer polling places even if such a policy
does not focus on areas with a higher concentration of voters from the opposition.
Given our research findings, Georgia policymakers may be interested to determine whether
voting resources, such as DREs, were idle in the 2016 election, and if so, why they were
idle. Operational transparency can increase trust in government (Buell et al. (2018)), so
Georgia policymakers could consider implementing laws promoting transparency in how
voting resources are being utilized in elections. Furthermore, Georgia policymakers may
also consider implementing legislation requiring the redistribution of all functioning voting
machines from closed polling places to reduce the chances of voter disenfranchisement from
waiting times at the polls.
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CHAPTER 3 : Drivers of Customer Satisfaction in a Tandem Queue: The Role of
Buffer Location, Perception of Fairness, and Punctuality
Coauthored with Christian Terwiesch, Santiago Gallino, and Shivan Mehta
3.1. Introduction
When receiving a service, be it in hospitality, travel, healthcare, or banking, customers
oftentimes have to wait. Numerous prior studies have empirically established that long
wait times lead to poor customer satisfaction (e.g., Davis and Vollmann (1990); Katz et al.
(1991); Anderson et al. (2007)) and adverse effects on business (e.g., Camacho et al. (2006);
Anderson et al. (2007); Allon et al. (2011); Akşin et al. (2013); Lu et al. (2013b); Batt and
Terwiesch (2015); Chan et al. (2017); Berry Jaeker and Tucker (2017)).
A subtle and mostly overlooked point related to waiting is that customers oftentimes expe-
rience multiple waiting episodes in different locations as part of one service encounter. In
addition, customers often wait commingled with others for an appointment with a server
(often privately assigned) for a scheduled appointment. Many types of queues share one
or more of these attributes. In a multiple-provider healthcare practice, patients wait for
a scheduled appointment with an assigned doctor in a waiting room and then again in an
exam room. In a restaurant, guests often place their name on a wait list for a table assign-
ment that can accommodate the party size. Oftentimes guests wait outside the restaurant
to receive a ping that the table is ready and then wait inside the restaurant to be seated.
In air travel, passengers wait at the gate, during the boarding process, and then again on
the tarmac for their scheduled takeoff.
The total waiting time during one overall service encounter is the aggregation of multiple
waiting episodes that occur at the various steps that make up for the encounter. This more
granular perspective of waiting begs the question to what extent the distribution of the total
waiting time over these waiting episodes impact the customer satisfaction. Consider three
patients at the multiple-provider healthcare practice. The first patient waits 30 minutes
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in the waiting room and is then promptly seen by her provider. The second patient waits
15 minutes in the waiting room and then again 15 minutes in an exam room before being
seen by his provider. The third patient is immediately moved to the exam room only to
wait there for 30 minutes before seeing her provider. All these patients wait for 30 minutes,
but which patient will be the most satisfied? Prior research offers conflicting predictions.
One might argue that waiting in the first stage might offend a customer the most, as the
customer could have delayed the arrival to the scheduled appointment and thus the happiest
patient is the third patient who spent no time in the waiting room. In contrast, the peak-
end rule, a well-established result in psychology (Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996)) and
recently supported in the operations transparency literature (Bray (2018)), emphasizes that
customer perception of an experience is dominated more by what happens at the peak and
end of the service encounter. The increased wait disutility from things such as anxiety that
the patient may experience in the exam room (versus the waiting room) and the fact that
the exam room is the end of the waiting experience would both suggest that our first patient
would be the most satisfied. But, the peak-end rule also can be interpreted that customers
will prefer two small waits over one large wait (keeping all levels of peak frustration low),
predicting that the second patient would be the most satisfied. Dividing up one long wait
into multiple short waits also provides the customer with a sense of progress (e.g., Soman
and Shi (2003)), consistent with the design of many theme parks in which long lines are
broken up into smaller lines so that customers always maintain a perception of progress.
How does the distribution of the total waiting time over multiple waiting episodes impact
the customer satisfaction? This is the first research question that we aim to study in this
paper. Dube-Rioux et al. (1989) tried to address this question experimentally in the context
of pre-process, in-process, and post-process waits, but there are a number of challenges that
have to be overcome to answer this question observationally which likely explains why it
has not yet been addressed. First, a study linking waiting episodes to customer satisfaction
requires more micro-level data about the duration of each waiting time episode as well as
an overall measure of customer satisfaction. Second, other experiences that can be observed
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through data might also impact the patient satisfaction during the waiting time and need to
be controlled for. And third, omitted data may also impact patient satisfaction during the
waiting episode, and so a standard regression of satisfaction on waiting times and observable
factors would yield a biased estimate. In this paper, we present an observational study of 560
patients that have been treated in the endoscopy suite of a large academic medical center.
After checking in upon arrival, patients wait in the first buffer, a reception area (on average
for 35 minutes). They then are moved to the second buffer, a pre-op area, where after
having been prepared for their procedure they wait again to be moved into the operating
room (on average, they wait for 55 minutes). Following their visit, patients are contacted by
an independent agency with the request to report their satisfaction. We develop a two-step
estimation procedure that provides an unbiased estimate for the marginal impact of waiting
time at each of the two buffer locations. We control for patient experiences that previous
research has identified as being detrimental to customer satisfaction such as the degree to
which patients are seen with respect to the order in which they arrived.
Consistent with prior work (e.g., Davis and Vollmann (1990); Katz et al. (1991); Taylor
(1994); Anderson et al. (2007)), we show that an increase in waiting time reduces customer
satisfaction. Specifically, we find that a 50% increase in a patient’s total wait time decreases
the patient’s expected satisfaction score by 0.21 points (on a 5-point scale). More impor-
tantly, we show that a 50% increase in a patient’s wait time in the second buffer results in
a decline in expected satisfaction seven times larger than the decline resulting from a 50%
increase in wait time in the first buffer. Furthermore, in an experiment, we find evidence
that patients may not necessarily enjoy smaller/equal waits in both buffers and that the
peak attribute (rather than the end attribute) of the wait in the second buffer may be
driving this result. As a result, managers can focus their efforts to identify the locations of
a tandem queue with higher wait disutility and target interventions such as providing wait
time fillers or additional staffing resources in these parts of the line.
Returning to our healthcare practice example, suppose that the three patients arrive to the
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waiting room at 10:00am, 10:00am, and 10:15am respectively. The first and second patients,
who arrived before the third patient, may perceive the third patient’s immediate movement
from the waiting room to the exam room as unfair despite not knowing her provider assign-
ment. We show the importance of perceived fairness when queues are transparent (see Buell
and Norton (2011); Buell et al. (2016)). Holding waiting times constant, we find that pa-
tients in the first buffer (where patient movements are transparent) experience a significant
decrease (increase) in satisfaction if a patient who arrived after (before) them is serviced
before (after) them despite patients not observing the doctor assignment of others. (Such
fairness has been shown to influence queue abandonment (e.g., Batt and Terwiesch (2015)),
but has not yet been linked to satisfaction.) Conversely, the hospital has more flexibility
to deviate from FIFO queue discipline in the second buffer (where patient movements are
not transparent). In a follow-up experiment, we provide causal evidence that when people
perceive cuts in line, satisfaction significantly decreases. Managers can use technology such
as paging systems to reduce transparency in areas of the queue where customers may be
able to perceive violations in FIFO queue discipline
Finally, in our example, suppose that the three patients have scheduled appointment times of
10:30am, 10:45am, and 10:15am respectively. Although all patients wait for 30 minutes, how
might the early start of the second patient affect his satisfaction and how might the late start
of patient three affect her satisfaction? Studies have suggested that “post-schedule” waits, or
the incremental wait time after the scheduled appointment time, could have a meaningful
impact on customer utility (Taylor (1994)). Moreover, prospect theory (Kahneman and
Tversky (2013)) suggests that perceived losses could impact satisfaction more than perceived
gains. We find evidence that patients may care more about losses of time (waits that
conclude after a scheduled appointment time) than gains in time (waits that conclude
before a scheduled appointment time). Managers can focus interventions on customers
(such as providing delay information) who are likely to experience delays from the scheduled
appointment time since these customers are likely to have a particularly painful experience.
In addition, managers can consider implementing initiatives that increase the buffer between
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a customer’s arrival time and the scheduled appointment time.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We first describe the clinical setting we
study (Section 3.2) followed by a review of the relevant literature and a statement of our
hypotheses in Section 3.3. Section 3.4 describes our data and Section 3.5 describes our study
of the impact of waiting time and location on patient satisfaction. Section 3.6 provides a
number of robustness checks for our observational study. Section 3.7 describes and discusses
the methods and results of three experiments that supplement the observational study.
Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 3.8.
3.2. Clinical Setting
We examine an ambulatory perioperative process at an endoscopic procedure center at a
large, urban teaching hospital from January 2014 to September 2017. Ambulatory patients
receiving an endoscopic procedure arrive at a check-in desk approximately one hour prior to
their scheduled procedure time. Following check-in, they are seated in reception (the first
buffer) where they complete all necessary medical forms with the help of administrative
or nurse staff. Reception is an open area where all patients wait . Once a patient arrives
at an available pre-op station (the second buffer), they change into a hospital gown and
receive an intravenous catheter (“IV”). Once pre-op preparation is complete, patients
wait in their individual pre-op station (with privacy curtains surrounding them) until the
operating room (“OR”), to which they are assigned, is ready for them. There are a total
of four main operating rooms in the center, and the most common procedures performed
include colonoscopy and esophagogastroduodenoscopy.
Within a couple weeks of procedure completion, a third-party company mails a satisfaction
survey to the patient. The survey provides the patient with the opportunity to provide
anonymous feedback to the hospital across multiple dimensions. The surveys are not com-
pulsory, so typically only a fraction of the number of surveys sent to patients are returned
to the hospital.
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3.3. Related Literature and Hypotheses
Congestions and longer wait times in service settings are often costly to businesses. In
healthcare, McCarthy et al. (2000) observed a positive association between waiting times
and missed appointments at an outpatient clinic. Camacho et al. (2006) found that longer
patient waits lowered the chances of a patient returning to a primary or specialty care
clinic. Anderson et al. (2007) observed that longer wait times for primary care significantly
decreased patient satisfaction. Batt and Terwiesch (2015) showed that longer perceived
waits could lead to patient departures from the ER before receiving service. Chan et al.
(2017) found that longer delays for intensive care admissions of patients could result in longer
length of stays. Berry Jaeker and Tucker (2017) demonstrated that high congestion in an
emergency department can lead to cost and patient severity issues if additional capacity is
not brought online during times of high occupancy. In retail, Davis and Vollmann (1990) and
Allon et al. (2011) found that customer wait times could negatively impact fast food retailers
while Lu et al. (2013b) found that longer queue lengths could reduce grocery purchases. In
the transportation industry, Taylor (1994) found that longer delays led customers to have
increased feelings of anger and uncertainty. In a banking call center, Akşin et al. (2013)
estimated a high waiting cost for high priority customers. Osuna (1985) and Janakiraman
et al. (2011) modeled customer utility in the queue as a concave function that decreases in
the total wait time for service. As a result of this research, we hypothesize the following in
our setting:
Hypothesis 1. Customers who have a longer total wait time before service (time in first
buffer plus time in second buffer) are less satisfied.
Given that waiting in queues can be a painful experience for customers, many studies have
put forth recommendations on how queues can be managed. Maister (1985); Larson (1987);
Katz et al. (1991) suggested that manipulating factors related to the customer’s psychology
in queue could greatly influence customer satisfaction. Whitt (1999); Osuna (1985); Mowen
et al. (1993) found that giving people information on their waits could improve service.
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Soman and Shi (2003) put forward the idea that increasing consumers’ perceptions of their
own progress could increase their wait tolerances. Carmon et al. (1995) recommended that
customer wait times be occupied with “filler” services to reduce the psychological cost of
waiting. Pruyn and Smidts (1998) found that the waiting room attractiveness could improve
the customer wait experience. Buell and Norton (2011); Buell et al. (2016) suggested that
giving customers transparency (or the illusion of transparency) into the waiting process
could increase the perceived value of the service received.
A limitation of the studies mentioned above is that they focused on the management of
the total wait time before some service of interest began. However, waits in many service
operations commonly take place in different pre-process locations (i.e., buffers) before the
service of interest begins. A patient may initially wait to see a doctor in a reception area,
but after some time, a nurse may take the patient to an exam room to wait before the
doctor is ready for the appointment. Thus, the total wait time can be expressed as the sum
of the wait time in the pre-process buffer locations (the wait time in the reception area plus
the wait time in the exam room). To our knowledge, no one has investigated how waits in
different buffer locations can be costly (or not) to businesses and how businesses can better
manage queues with multiple pre-process buffers. Dube-Rioux et al. (1989) technically
examined customer preferences for waiting in different locations in a restaurant, but their
study was based on a survey experiment and not on the actual experience of the customer.
Carmon and Kahneman (1996) ran an experiment to examine the utility of participants in a
virtual line throughout the duration of a wait for service. They found that when participants
advanced in line, they experienced an increase in their experimentally measured utility. In
settings where customers wait in two pre-process buffer locations, we can assume that
utility rises when they enter the second pre-process buffer. We could then theoretically
have a customer’s utility decline at different rates in the first and second pre-process buffers
in response to their waiting times in each location. Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996)
demonstrated the peak-end rule which suggests that patient utility is most impacted at
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the peak (or most intensive part) of the experience and the end of the experience. In
addition, Bray (2018) suggested that customer satisfaction is impacted most positively
when operational transparency is provided later in the wait. Pre-op is not only the second
(i.e., later) buffer but patients may also be less comfortable having to wait in a hospital
gown with an IV in their hand and patient stress may be higher due to the anxiety-inducing
procedure occurring after this buffer (Yung et al. (2002)). Anecdotally, customers in other
settings may typically face steeper declines in utility in the second pre-process buffer in
response to wait times there. For example, in 2009, the federal government set fines for
airlines who made passengers wait too long on the tarmac (see Wald (2009)). Because
pre-op is both the later and more clinically/emotionally intensive buffer, we propose the
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Customers will experience steeper declines in satisfaction in response to
waiting times in the second buffer.
Many papers describe how customers experience queues. Maister (1985) suggested that
fair waits are less painful to customers than unfair waits. We define fair queues as those
that adhere to FIFO queue discipline. Often, customers may not wait in a physical line
but may wait in a general waiting area commingled with others waiting for service and
may, therefore, assess FIFO queue discipline. Milgram et al. (1986); Helweg-Larsen and
LoMonaco (2008) show that violations of FIFO queue discipline by others in line can be
an unpleasant experience for queue participants. Batt and Terwiesch (2015) found that
patients waiting for emergency services in a hospital may renege in response to the arrival
of new patients that could potentially jump ahead of them in line. In our study, patients
can better assess FIFO queue discipline in the first buffer since the reception waiting room
is commingled whereas in the second buffer, pre-op, waiting occurs in individual stations
which are partitioned off. We believe patients could assess FIFO queue discipline, and we
use heuristics to gauge each patient’s experience of FIFO queue discipline: the number of
other patients they observe who arrive later (earlier) but advance to the next location in
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the process earlier (later). These heuristics could be better assessed in the first buffer, and
as a result, we propose the set of hypotheses below:
Hypothesis 3A. In a buffer where customer arrivals are observable, a customer’s satisfac-
tion decreases (increases) when the number of other customers who arrive later (earlier) to
the buffer but advance to the next stage in the process earlier (later) increases.
Hypothesis 3B. In a buffer where customer arrivals are not observable, FIFO queue disci-
pline does not impact customer satisfaction.
Taylor (1994) suggests that “post-schedule” waits, or the incremental wait time after the
scheduled appointment time, could have a meaningful impact on customer utility. Therefore,
the airline industry, for example, stresses the importance of on-time performance. Given
that patients have a scheduled service time and may be cognizant of post-schedule waits
(for example by checking the time the procedure is scheduled relative to the approximate
time they are wheeled out of pre-op), utility could fall in response to longer post-schedule
waits. Similarly, utility could rise in response to service beginning before the scheduled
time.
Research shows that people may make mental accounts for time (Rajagopal and Rha (2009)).
Thus, when given an estimated wait time, people may create a mental account for how long
they are prepared to wait. However, we believe patients may be much more sensitive to
perceived losses of time (relative to their budgeted wait time) versus perceived gains in
time due to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (2013). The regret of arriving to an
appointment too early may impact utility to a larger degree than the joy of knowing one is
proceeding ahead of schedule. We therefore hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 4. Customer satisfaction is impacted to a smaller (larger) degree by waits that
conclude before (after) a scheduled wait time.
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3.4. Observational Study - Data Description
From January 2014 to September 2017, 20,881 patients received an endoscopy procedure
at the hospital. For each patient, we obtained detailed timestamp information on the
process flow: (i) Time the patient entered the facility; (ii) Time the patient entered pre-
op; (iii) Time the patient entered the OR; (iv) Time the procedure began; (v) Time the
procedure completed; (vi) Time the patient exited the OR. Out of these patients, 583
submitted the patient satisfaction survey used in this analysis. Because we are interested
in measuring the satisfaction of patients with respect to their waiting experiences in the
queue, SATISFACTIONi is patient i’s rating of the following item in the satisfaction
survey: Waiting time before your surgery or procedure began. This item, in addition to all
items in the satisfaction survey, were rated on the following scale: 1 – very poor, 2 – poor,
3 – fair, 4 – good, or 5 – very good, so higher ratings corresponded to higher satisfaction.
LOGTOTALWAITi is the log of the difference (in minutes) between the time patient i
started service (i.e., entered the OR) and the time the patient entered the first buffer. This
variable allows us to test Hypothesis 1. LOGBUFFER1WAITi is the log of the difference
(in minutes) between the time patient i entered the second buffer (pre-op) and the time
the patient entered the first buffer (reception). LOGBUFFER2WAITi is the log of the
difference (in minutes) between the time patient i started service and the time the patient
entered the second buffer. These two variables allow us to test Hypothesis 2. Figure 9
shows a histogram of each of the non-logged wait times.
Given that we had the timestamps of each patient’s movements throughout the day, we
reconstructed patient flow through the facility and calculated variables relating each pa-
tient’s position in the process relative to other patients’ positions. (Note that for all patient
flow-related calculations, we did not count patients who were missing data for any of the
timestamps used to calculate the variable. We also ignored patients for whom the pro-
cedure was canceled.) The variable BUFFER1CUTSi is the number of patients who
arrived after patient i in the first buffer but who entered the second buffer before patient
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Figure 9: Histograms of the non-logged total wait time in reception (RECEPTIONWAIT )
and pre-op (PREOPWAIT )
i. BUFFER2CUTSi is the number of patients who arrived after patient i in the second
buffer but who entered service before patient i. In addition, we define BUFFER1ADVi as
the number of patients who arrive before patient i in the first buffer but who entered the
second buffer after patient i and BUFFER2ADVi as the number of patients who arrived
before patient i in the second buffer but who entered service after patient i. These four
variables will allow us to test Hypothesis 3.
To test Hypothesis 4, we tabulated the difference (in minutes) between the time patient i
entered service and the time the patient was scheduled for service (DELAYi). Therefore,
this variable represents the patient’s delay with respect to their scheduled procedure time.
We expect that increases in this variable will lead to decreases in satisfaction. We also
include the square (DELAY 2i ) and cubic (DELAY
3
i ) terms to test Hypothesis 4 since we
anticipate increases in DELAY will impact satisfaction to a greater degree than decreases
in the variable.
In our analysis, we aim to control for other factors that may impact a patient’s satisfaction
and be related to either wait times in reception or pre-op but are not driven by the location
of a specific buffer. Businesses often provide customers information on the queue as waits for
service become longer (e.g., explanations for delays), and as mentioned above, this practice
may increase customer utility. In our setting, any information on longer waits (which could
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help increase patient satisfaction) is more likely to come about later in the wait in the
second buffer (i.e., pre-op). We therefore controlled for patient i’s response to the following
item in the satisfaction survey: Information nurses gave you on the day of your procedure.
Congestion or lack of training of staff in the first or second buffer may lead to lower staff
responsiveness in either location. As a result, a patient who experiences longer waits in a
location with less responsive staff may have their satisfaction decline faster in that location.
We therefore control for responsiveness of first buffer staff using patient i’s response to
the following item in the satisfaction survey: Helpfulness of the person at the registration
desk. Because patients are primarily dependent on nurses for their non-urgent needs in the
second buffer, we control for the responsiveness of pre-op staff using patient i’s response to
the following in the survey: Friendliness/courtesy of the nurses.
The number of patients in the first buffer, a location where patients wait in a common area,
may make patients more susceptible to externalities from congestion such as noise from
other patients. Lower et al. (2003) found that patients were more satisfied and Yoder et al.
(2012) found that patients had better sleep outcomes in quieter hospital environments. The
number of other patients who are in reception can vary over the duration a patient is in the
location. To control for congestion, we use a proxy based on the number of other patients
who arrived before patient i and proceeded into pre-op after patient i arrived.
Patients who are less healthy may require more time in pre-op but may be more uncom-
fortable and less satisfied waiting in general. Patients who are older, female (see Macintyre
et al. (1996)), and of certain races (see Williams (1997)) may face different health issues.
We therefore control for the age, gender, and race of each patient.
Olowokure et al. (2006) provided evidence that patients receiving cervical screening tests
preferred certain times of day for their appointments. We therefore wanted to control for
any potential effect the time of day of a patient’s arrival to the endoscopy suite could have
on the patient’s satisfaction with the wait before the procedure. We therefore controlled for
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the time of day patient i arrived.
Patients who receive a colonoscopy have to avoid solid food the day before the procedure.
Dube-Rioux et al. (1989) showed that when customers are hungry in a restaurant setting,
in-process waits can be more painful than pre-process waits. Because in-process waits come
after pre-process waits, it is possible that patients receiving a colonoscopy may have steeper
declines in satisfaction in the second buffer. We therefore control for whether patient i was
receiving a colonoscopy procedure.
Finally, we aim to control for any potential discomfort patients may have encountered
relating to the location setting (e.g., air conditioning or heating issues, lack of chairs in
reception, uncomfortable beds in pre-op, etc.). With respect to the first buffer, we control
for patient i’s survey response to: Comfort of the registration waiting area. For the second
buffer, we control for patient i’s response to the following item in the survey: Comfort of
your room or resting area in the Center.
Our final sample size, after eliminating patients surveyed who either had missing or inaccu-
rate timestamp information (e.g., patients who had arrival times in the first buffer recorded
as occurring after the time the patient was placed in the second buffer) or who did not
have data on one of the survey items was n=560. Table 3 shows a summary of the main
variables used in our analysis. We observe that satisfaction scores tend to be really high
in our sample (4.377 on average), so even small effect sizes detected in our study can be
quite meaningful. Note that we did include in our analysis data from two patients who had
timestamps indicating a zero minute wait time in the first buffer. Because we took the log
of the wait time in the first buffer, we coded these wait times as equal to 1 minute. We
also included data from four patients who did not arrive at the center on the day of their
procedure. Because these patients did not have to wait in the first buffer, we recorded the
wait times there as equal to 1 minute as well. Finally, we based the wait time in the second
buffer of one patient on the time the patient had been recorded to have exited the second
buffer rather than the time the patient started service because the service start time seemed
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erroneously recorded.
Table 3: Summary of regressand and regressors of interest
Statistic SATISFACTION TOTALWAIT BUFFER1WAIT BUFFER2WAIT BUFFER1CUTS BUFFER2CUTS BUFFER1ADV BUFFER2ADV DELAY
Mean 4.377 89.171 34.568 54.604 0.313 0.3 0.338 0.338 16.095
Std. Dev. 0.862 39.312 29.323 25.924 0.861 0.671 0.594 0.6 40.965
Minimum 1 14 1 7 0 0 0 0 -351
Maximum 5 439 357 171 12 6 3 4 159
25%ile 4 62 16 36 0 0 0 0 -4
50%ile 5 83 25 49 0 0 0 0 12
75%ile 5 108 46 66 0 0 1 1 38
3.5. Observational Study - Model and Results
3.5.1. Model
We are interested in examining how different factors impact patient satisfaction through
regression analysis. Given the hypotheses and variables described above, we are interested
in the following two ordinary least squares (“OLS”) regression specifications:
SATISFACTIONi =α1 + β1LOGTOTALWAITi + ω1BUFFER1CUTSi+







iµ1 + ε1i (3.1)
SATISFACTIONi =α2 + β2LOGBUFFER1WAITi + γ2LOGBUFFER2WAITi+
ω2BUFFER1CUTSi + δ2BUFFER2CUTSi+







iµ2 + ε2i (3.2)
where i is the index for each individual patient and Xi is the vector of control variables.
Omitted variable bias is a common issue in any OLS specification. One example of potential
omitted variable bias in our setting is that we do not observe the state of health of each
patient (e.g., body mass index, blood pressure, etc.) and only control for factors which may
be correlated with health (i.e., age, gender, and race). Because patients who are less healthy
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may require more time in the second buffer (i.e., pre-op) but may be more uncomfortable
and less satisfied waiting in general, we have an omitted variable bias in γ2 of Equation
3.2. We propose the instrumental variable PATIENTSAHEADi, which is the number
of other patients (assigned to the same OR as patient i) who have yet to complete service
before patient i when patient i enters the second buffer, to overcome omitted variable
bias. The mean and standard deviation of PATIENTSAHEADi are 0.852 and 0.711
respectively and Figure 10 shows its distribution. Because PATIENTSAHEADi is a
function of how the hospital schedules its patients, it should be unrelated to a particular
patient’s health, thus satisfying the exogeneity requirement of an instrument. However,
PATIENTSAHEADi should play a key role in how long a patient waits in pre-op since
it represents the inventory of patients that must complete their procedures before patient
i, thus satisfying the relevance requirement of an instrument. To check the exogeneity
requirement of PATIENTSAHEADi, we run three analysis of variance (“ANOVA”) tests
examining the difference in means of PATIENTSAHEADi conditional on the categories
of age, gender, and race, which all may be correlated with health as discussed above. These
tests allows us to examine whether health may play a role in the patient scheduling decisions
(e.g., if doctors tend to schedule healthier patients in the morning when there is less likely
to be more patients ahead in the process). None of the F-statistics came back as significant.
For the ANOVA with age, the p-value was 0.247 and for gender, the p-value was 0.938. The
ANOVA for race had a p-value of 0.314.
To estimate Equation 3.2, we need to use two-stage least squares (“2SLS”) with the following
first-stage regression specification:
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Figure 10: Distribution of PATIENTSAHEAD
LOGBUFFER2WAITi =α3 + β3LOGBUFFER1WAITi + γ3PATIENTSAHEADi+
ω3BUFFER1CUTSi + δ3BUFFER2CUTSi+







iµ3 + ε3i (3.3)
Our first-stage regression suggests that the relevance condition of our instrument is met
with an F-statistic of 107.5 which far exceeds the rule-of-thumb of 10 (see Staiger and Stock
(1997)).
We then estimate the second-stage regression using the predictions generated from Equation
3.3, ̂LOGBUFFER2WAITi:
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SATISFACTIONi =α4 + β4LOGBUFFER1WAITi + γ4 ̂LOGBUFFER2WAITi+
ω4BUFFER1CUTSi + δ4BUFFER2CUTSi+







iµ4 + ε4i (3.4)
Note that our model would be misspecified if PATIENTSAHEADi impacted the re-
sponsiveness of staff in the second stage which may then affect patient satisfaction
with the wait before the procedure. To ensure this is not the case in our data, we
run an ANOVA which tests the difference of the means of the responsiveness ratings
of nurse staff (i.e., patient i’s response to the following: Friendliness/courtesy of the
nurses) stratified by PATIENTSAHEADi. The F-statistic was not significant (p-
value=0.510). Our model would also be misspecified if PATIENTSAHEADi was strongly
related to wait times in the first buffer. However, when we perform a 2SLS first-
stage regression using LOGBUFFER1WAITi as the endogenous regressor (rather than
LOGBUFFER2WAITi), we find that PATIENTSAHEADi is a weak instrument (F-
statistic of 8.99). Thus, we believe our model is properly specified.
3.5.2. Results
Table 15 shows our regression results for our regressors of interest and Table 28 shows our
regression results for our other regressors. Our first regression specification from Equation
3.1, OLS (Total), provides evidence for Hypothesis 1. Specifically, we find that the coefficient
on LOGTOTALWAIT is negative and significant, and a 50% increase in a patient’s total
wait time decreases the patient’s expected satisfaction score by 0.17 points (on a 5-point
scale). Therefore, a patient’s total wait time before service seems to negatively impact their
satisfaction.
The regression model, 2SLS, is our main specification stemming from Equations 3.3 and 3.4.
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Table 4: Regression results for regressors of interest in the observational study
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS 2SLS







BUFFER1CUTS -0.095** -0.129*** -0.125***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.041)
BUFFER2CUTS -0.067 -0.069 0.000
(0.076) (0.080) (0.090)
BUFFER1ADV 0.135** 0.169*** 0.179***
(0.062) (0.063) (0.063)
BUFFER2ADV -0.008 -0.000 -0.057
(0.045) (0.044) (0.057)
DELAY -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
DELAY 2 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
DELAY 3 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 560 560 560
R2 0.454 0.451 0.437
H0: ̂βLOGBUFFER2WAIT - ̂βLOGBUFFER1WAIT=0
p-value: 0.096* 0.022**
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
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For our Hypothesis 2 we find evidence that patients do face steeper declines in satisfaction
in the second buffer. If a patient’s wait time were to increase by 50% in the second buffer,
the average satisfaction score would decline by 0.21 points, whereas the same magnitude of
increase in the first buffer wait would lead to a 0.03 point decline. We also test the null
hypothesis that the second buffer coefficient minus the first buffer coefficient is significantly
different from zero, and the result is significant. Wooldridge (1995)’s test for endogeneity
with robust standard errors suggests that the second regression specification, OLS (Loca-
tion), may be endogenous (p-value=0.083). If we did not take into account endogeneity of
waits in the second buffer, the effect size for this regressor would have been less than half
the size.
Per Hypothesis 3, we observe that the number of patients who overtake a patient in the first
buffer (where customer arrivals are observable) does impact a patient’s satisfaction whereas
in the second buffer (where customer arrivals are not observable) it does not. Each incident
in the first buffer reduces the average patient satisfaction score by -0.125. Similarly, for each
individual a patient overtakes in the first buffer, the satisfaction score increases by 0.179
on average, whereas in the second buffer, the effect is not significant. Our results indicate
that customers may track FIFO queue discipline in locations of the queue where there is no
physical line but other customers are more visible.
With respect to Hypothesis 4, our regression result suggests that increases in DELAY result
in decreases in patient satisfaction. However, the coefficients on the square and cubic terms
of DELAY were not significant. As a result, we were note able to support Hypothesis 4
with our observational study, however we test the hypothesis again using an experiment in
Section 3.7.
With respect to our controls, we find that providing patients with information on the day
of the procedure may have a significant impact on patient satisfaction. In particular, a one
point increase in a patient’s satisfaction with respect to whether they were informed leads to
a 0.418 increase in the average patient satisfaction score in the 2SLS model. Hospital staff
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could consider providing patients with information such as the actual number of patients
ahead in the process, updates on the expected wait time, or explanations on any delays
throughout the waiting experience.
We also find that the number of other patients in reception may decrease satisfaction. For
each additional patient in the reception waiting area, average patient satisfaction decreases
by 0.125 points. This finding suggests that patient externalities, such as noise, may affect
patients in commingled areas such as reception. Our results also indicate that patient
satisfaction increases with more helpful registration staff, higher levels of comfort in their
room/resting area, and during two times of the day at the endoscopy center. For all other
controls not discussed, we found no significant effect in our estimation.
3.6. Observational Study - Robustness Tests for Hypothesis 2
Below we discuss four robustness tests for our observational results:
3.6.1. Proportion Effect
Our econometric specification does not take into account the fact that patients may actually
care about the proportion of time they spend waiting in each location rather than the
location itself. For example, suppose two patients wait 100 minutes before entering the OR.
Patient 1 waited 25 minutes in reception and felt increasingly frustrated that the wait in
pre-op was much longer than the wait in reception. Patient 2, however, waited 50 minutes in
reception and was expecting to wait about the same amount of time in pre-op and thus was
not very frustrated with the 50 minute wait. Because we observe longer waits on average
in pre-op in our data, this effect could be an alternative explanation for our support of
Hypothesis 2. To check whether this alternative explanation is viable in our data, we ran
the following OLS regression specification that controls for this effect:
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SATISFACTIONi =α5 + β5BUFFER1DIV BUFFER2WAITi+
γ5BUFFER2WAITi + ω5BUFFER1CUTSi+
δ5BUFFER2CUTSi + ζ5BUFFER1ADVi+







iµ5 + ε5i (3.5)
where BUFFER1WAITi is patient i’s total wait in the second buffer and
BUFFER1DIV BUFFER2WAITi is patient i’s wait in the first buffer divided by the
wait in the second buffer. A significant coefficient for β5 would indicate the presence of
the proportion effect in our data since it would suggest that an increase in the disparity
between the wait in the first buffer and the wait in the second buffer impacts patient sat-
isfaction. However, we do not find a significant coefficient on β5 in our regression results
(p-value=0.369).
3.6.2. Nonlinear Total Wait Utility
Osuna (1985) suggests that customer utility in response to waiting times decreases and is
concave (i.e., decreasing at an increasing rate in later stages). Shimkin and Mandelbaum
(2004) and Janakiraman et al. (2011) also suggest that waiting costs may have a nonlinear
effect. In our study, a patient may become dissatisfied at an increasing rate in response
to the total wait time before service. Because pre-op is the second buffer (i.e., pre-op
waits occur later in the process than reception waits), pre-op waits would appear to be
more painful if patients are becoming increasingly dissatisfied in response to the total wait
time. To check whether this alternative explanation for Hypothesis 2 is viable, we run the
following OLS regression:
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iµ6 + ε6i (3.6)
where TOTALWAITi is patient i’s total wait time before service. If patients are becoming
dissatisfied at an increasing rate in response to the total wait time before service, we would
expect γ6 in our data to have a significant, negative slope. However, after running this
regression, we find that γ6 is not significant (p-value=0.562).
3.6.3. Instrument as a Factor
The distribution of our instrumental variable, PATIENTSAHEAD, which is shown in
Figure 10 does not look uniform and only takes on four different values. Therefore,
we wanted to ensure our 2SLS results were still valid if the instrumental variable were
treated as a factor variable rather than a continuous variable. After performing the re-
gression, we find nearly identical results to our original 2SLS specification: a negative
coefficient on LOGBUFFER2WAIT (γ̂4=-0.495 and p-value=0.007) that is significantly
larger (p-value=0.019) than the coefficient on LOGBUFFER1WAIT (β̂4=-0.080 and p-
value=0.081).
3.6.4. Two-Stage Residual Inclusion
Given that SATISFACTION could be thought of as an ordinal rather than continuous
variable, we wanted to ensure that our results still held using an ordinal method. Equation
3.1 can simply be adapted from OLS to ordinal logistic regression using maximum likelihood
to test Hypothesis 1. However, for testing the other hypotheses, which require 2SLS, we
cannot simply modify Equation 3.4 to become an ordinal logistic regression. Terza et al.
(2008) found that the technique of including the first stage predicted values from two-stage
least squares (2SLS) into a non-linear second stage regression does not result in consistent
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estimation of the second stage coefficients on the regressors. Instead, the authors found that
including the residuals from the first stage of 2SLS and the original endogenous regressor into
a non-linear second stage regression in addition to all the usual exogenous variables resulted
in consistent estimation of the coefficients on the regressors in a method known as two-stage
residual inclusion (“2SRI”). With respect to implementing 2SRI in our robustness check,
we estimate the residuals ûi for each patient resulting from our first-stage 2SLS regression
estimation specified in Equation 3.3:
ûi = LOGPREOPWAITi − ̂LOGPREOPWAITi (3.7)
In the second stage, we use the residuals from the first stage and run the following ordinal
logistic regression specification:
SATISFACTIONi =α7 + ψ7 + ρ7 + π7 + β7LOGBUFFER1WAITi+
γ7LOGBUFFER2WAITi + ω7BUFFER1CUTSi+
δ7BUFFER2CUTSi + ζ7BUFFER1ADVi+







iµ7 + ρ7ûi + ε7i (3.8)
We then performed bootstrapping of the observations to create 10,000 resampled data
sets to calculate the proper standard errors for hypothesis testing. (Note that 81 of the
resampled data sets suffered from collinearity issues and could not be estimated.) The 2SRI
results continue to show a significant, negative coefficient on LOGBUFFER2WAIT (γ̂7=-
1.964 and p-value=0.009) that is significantly larger (p-value=0.034) than the coefficient on
LOGBUFFER1WAIT (β̂7=-0.435 and p-value=0.065).
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3.7. Experiments
To replicate findings in our observational study and support a causal interpretation of our
results, we ran three randomized controlled experiments with adult subjects from the Ama-
zon Mechanical Turk platform who completed simulated waiting experiences. In Experiment
1, we disentangle whether patient satisfaction declines quicker in pre-op in response to wait
times due to the fact that pre-op is the second/last pre-process buffer or the buffer with
higher wait disutility (e.g., clinical and/or emotional intensity). In the experiment, we had
each subject wait in a two-part tandem queue to complete two different surveys. All sub-
jects waited for the same amount of time, however we were able to change the proportion
of time that subjects waited in the two stages, and while waiting, the subjects listened to
different sounds (as a proxy for wait disutility). We find that subject satisfaction declined
in response to the disutility of the wait rather than longer wait times in the second stage.
In Experiment 2, we provide causal evidence that customers care about FIFO queue disci-
pline in multi-server settings where server assignment of other customers waiting is unknown
and customers can view queue progress of other customers in an open waiting area. In the
experiment, each subject waits for the same amount of time for one of three different servers
who the subject has chosen to administer a quiz. The subject does not observe the server
assignment of others. The subject waits in an open waiting area and can view other sub-
jects entering the area and exiting the area into service. In particular, we find that subject
satisfaction declined in response to perceived cuts in line.
In Experiment 3, we provide causal evidence for Hypothesis 4. In the experiment, all sub-
jects wait for the same amount of time to complete a survey. Subjects are given an estimated
wait time for a server who will administer a survey. The actual wait times for subjects con-
clude early, on-time, or after the scheduled wait time. We find that subject satisfaction in
the delayed condition was significantly lower than that in the on-time condition. However,
subject satisfaction in the early condition was not significantly different from the on-time
condition.
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3.7.1. Location of Wait vs. Wait Disutility (Experiment 1)
Methods. In a pre-experiment, we recruited twenty nine subjects to rate the pleasantness
(i.e., disutility) of six different ambient sounds: a baby crying (Baby), alarm clock (Alarm),
lawnmower (Lawnmower), meditation bowls (Bowls), a creek (Creek), and piano music
(Piano). To ensure subjects were incentive compatible and actually listened to the sounds,
we inserted two spoken words into the ambient sound file, one in a random position prior
to the end of the sound file and another at the end of the sound file, and subjects were not
informed about the length of each sound file. Subjects understood that they would receive
bonus payments for each word correctly identified. The subjects rated each of the ambient
sounds from strongly unpleasant (coded as 1) to strongly pleasant (coded as 7). After
analyzing the responses of subjects who passed a comprehension check of the experiment
and who correctly identified all the spoken words in the six ambient sound files, we found
that the alarm clock and baby crying were the most unpleasant sounds (and virtually
indistinguishable in terms of unpleasantness), and the piano music was the most pleasant
sound (see Table 5). We then defined a high disutility wait as one which a subject would
listen to the alarm clock and a low disutility wait as one which a subject would listen to
the piano.
For the main experiment, two hundred and seventy three adult subjects were recruited to
complete a two-part survey in which they would have to wait to complete each part of the
survey. Each subject waited a total of 100 seconds, with the wait for the second part of
the survey being 25 seconds (Short 2nd Wait), 50 seconds (Equal Waits), or 100 seconds
(Long 2nd Wait). In addition, during both the first wait and second wait, subjects listened
either to piano music (Low Disutility 1st Wait/Low Disutility 2nd Wait) or the alarm clock
(High Disutility 1st Wait/High Disutility 2nd Wait) in the background. All subjects were
randomly assigned to one of the twelve conditions (see Table 6). To ensure subjects were
incentive compatible and listened to the sounds and paid attention to the wait experience,
we used the same technique as in the pre-experiment with the spoken words and only
included in our study those subjects who passed a comprehension check of the experiment
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Table 5: Results for the pre-experiment measuring sound pleasantness
DV: Pleasantness (1-Strongly Unpleasant to 7-Strongly Pleasant) Linear Regression
Baby (vs. Alarm) 0.000
(0.133)
Lawnmower (vs. Alarm) 1.000***
(0.188)
Bowls (vs. Alarm) 3.828***
(0.220)
Creek (vs. Alarm) 4.069***
(0.219)









Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
and who correctly identified all the spoken words. After completing the two waits, subjects
were asked to rate the overall waiting experience for both parts of the survey from very
poor (coded as 1) to very good (coded as 5), a scale consistent with the satisfaction survey
used in our observational study. See Section A.8 for more details on Experiment 1.
Table 6: Number of subjects per condition in the location of wait vs. wait disutility exper-
iment
Low Disutility 1st Wait High Disutility 1st Wait
Subjects (273) Low Disutility 2nd Wait High Disutility 2nd Wait Low Disutility 2nd Wait High Disutility 2nd Wait
Short 2nd Wait 22 27 19 15
Equal Waits 19 20 29 21
Long 2nd Wait 26 25 28 22
Results. We find evidence that the disutility of the wait significantly reduced satisfaction
with the overall waiting experience in both the first and second parts of the wait (see
Table 7). However, we did not find evidence that equal waits or longer second stage waits
significantly impacted overall satisfaction with the wait. Equal Waits had a coefficient
estimate close to zero, however we acknowledge that the larger, negative coefficient on Long
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2nd Wait could lack significance due to sample size limitations (see Section A.7 for a power
analysis we conducted).
Table 7: Results for the location of wait vs. wait disutility experiment
DV: Satisfaction (1-Very Poor to 5-Very Good) OLS
Equal Waits (vs. Short 2nd Wait) 0.022
(0.274)
Long 2nd Wait (vs. Short 2nd Wait) -0.290
(0.267)
High Disutility 1st Wait (vs. Low Disutility 1st Wait) -0.663***
(0.253)
High Disutility 2nd Wait (vs. Low Disutility 2nd Wait) -1.099***
(0.251)
Equal Waits x High Disutility 1st Wait -0.185
(0.342)
Long 2nd Wait x High Disutility 1st Wait 0.281
(0.333)
Equal Waits x High Disutility 2nd Wait -0.059
(0.346)
Long 2nd Wait x High Disutility 2nd Wait -0.107
(0.336)
High Disutility 1st Wait x High Disutility 2nd Wait 0.426
(0.387)
Equal Waits x High Disutility 1st Wait x High Disutility 2nd Wait -0.388
(0.515)







Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
Discussion. Our results help to rule out that patients may prefer waiting in equal time
increments. In addition, our results suggest that waits in pre-op may be dissatisfying for
patients due to the disutility of the wait rather than the fact that it is the second/last
wait. The issue of pre-op being the second/last wait is unavoidable, however the issue of
wait disutility (e.g., patient comfort and anxiety) can potentially be mitigated. Studies
have found that interventions related to sound/music (Yung et al. (2002); Johnson et al.
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(2012)) could help to alleviate patient anxiety. Shell and Buell (2019) found that human
contact could alleviate customer anxiety in service settings, so having nurses check in with
patients more frequently could be another potential solution to combat the quick decline in
satisfaction patients experience in pre-op.
3.7.2. Perceived Fairness (Experiment 2)
Methods. One hundred and seventy subjects were recruited to take a math, logic, or
writing quiz that was administered by one of three fictitious servers specializing in one quiz
type. The subject chose one quiz type to take and were assigned an animal avatar so that
the subject could see themselves waiting in the virtual environment. Subjects were then
required to wait for the server in an open waiting area where they could see the animal
avatars of other fictitious subjects that were supposedly waiting to take their quizzes with
any one of the three servers (see Figure 11 for a visualization of the open waiting area that
subjects experience). Each subject waited for 100 seconds. While in the opening waiting
area, subjects randomly experienced one of three conditions:
• FIFO : When the subject enters, two other avatars are already in the waiting area.
Those two avatars depart the waiting area into service, one after the other. The
subject then sees the arrival of three additional avatars individually. The subject
then enters service. Thus, the subject believes she is the third (out of six) to arrive
to the waiting area and the third (out of six) to enter service.
• Advance in Line: When the subject enters, two other avatars are already in the
waiting area. The subject then sees the arrival of three additional avatars and then
enters service before the other two who were present prior to the subject’s arrival.
Thus, the subject believes she is the third (out of six) to arrive to the waiting area
and the first (out of six) to enter service.
• View Cuts in Line: When the subject enters, two other avatars are already in the
waiting area. Those two avatars depart the waiting area into service, one after the
other. The subject then sees the arrival of three additional avatars individually, and
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two of these avatars enter service before the subject enters into service. Thus, the
subject believes she is the third (out of six) to arrive to the waiting area and the fifth
(out of six) to enter service.
Figure 11: Snapshot of the open waiting area subjects experienced in Experiment 2. New
avatars enter through the ”ENTRANCE”, ”You” indicates the avatar of the subject, and
when avatars proceed into service, they move from a chair to the ”Now Serving” box.
Table 8 shows the number of subjects assigned to each condition. To encourage subjects to
pay attention to the movements of the other fictitious subjects in the open waiting area, we
provided a bonus to subjects who were able to identify the animal avatar of the individual
who entered service immediately before the subject. After the wait was complete, we asked
subjects to rate the waiting experience for their server from very poor (coded as 1) to
very good (coded as 5). In our analysis, we only included subjects who made a correct
identification and who passed a comprehension check of the experiment. See Section A.8
for more details on Experiment 2.
Results. Our results suggest that queue discipline may impact subject satisfaction despite
subjects not knowing the server assignment of others. In particular, subjects were negatively
impacted when they perceived cuts in line (i.e., others entering the open waiting area
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Table 8: Number of subjects per condition in the perceived fairness experiment
Subjects (170)
FIFO 63
Advance in Line 43
View Cuts in Line 64
after them and departing into service before them). Interestingly, subjects did not have a
significant boost in satisfaction when they experienced jumping the line in front of others.
See Table 9 for the results.
Table 9: Results for the perceived fairness experiment
DV: Satisfaction (1-Very Poor to 5-Very Good) OLS
Advance in Line (vs. FIFO) -0.170
(0.184)







Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
Discussion. Unlike our observational study, we find evidence that jumping the line did
not significantly impact satisfaction. One possible explanation is that subjects may have
positive utility associated with fair outcomes in queues (Ulku et al. (2019)), so the increase
in utility from jumping the line could be offset by negative emotions stemming from a lack of
fairness in the system. However, it is clear from our observational and experimental studies
that people perceive and are impacted by ”cuts” in line even when the server assignment
of others is unknown.
We recommend that managers take advantage of the levels of customer transparency that
different buffer locations offer to prevent customer dissatisfaction due to queue discipline
issues. One solution is to have customers with longer expected wait times stay in locations of
the queue that are less transparent since these customers are not only likely to be overtaken
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in line but also are less likely to overtake others in line. (However, this recommendation
would not work well in our clinical setting given that we show satisfaction declines faster
in the less transparent second buffer.) Another solution comes from the Department of
Radiology in the hospital system we study. Patients are given buzzers which allow them to
roam around a large reception area before they check in with registration staff. The buzzer
system makes the queue less transparent. Customers are free to roam within a vicinity of
the reception area and no longer need to commingle with other customers in line and are
thus less likely to observe other customer movements. In addition, customers do not need
to wait near the service entrance where customer names are likely to be called for service
and customer movements into service are more likely to be observed. As a result of the
buzzer system, FIFO adherence becomes less salient, and customers may be less likely to
monitor deviations from FIFO.
3.7.3. Scheduled Wait Times (Experiment 3)
Methods. Seven hundred and ninety five subjects were recruited to take a survey which
they believed a fictitious server was individually administering for each subject. As a result,
subjects believed that they needed to wait for an unknown amount of time for a server.
Each subject was randomly assigned to wait 100 or 160 seconds (100 Seconds/160 Seconds)
for the fictitious server and was given one estimated wait time corresponding to the 100 or
160 second waits respectively:
• 50 or 110 seconds (Late Finish)
• 100 or 160 seconds (On-time Finish)
• 150 or 210 seconds (Early Finish)
Each subject waited in a virtual waiting area by themselves where they could see a timer
showing how long they had been waiting and the assigned estimated wait time. In addition,
some subjects were randomly assigned to have a bar shown in the virtual waiting area
showing progress towards the estimated wait time to increase the salience of the actual
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wait time versus the estimated wait time (Bar/No Bar). In total, there were 12 conditions
with the number of subjects in each shown in Table 10. To ensure subjects paid attention
to the conclusion of the actual wait time relative to the estimated wait time, subjects
were paid a bonus for identifying an image that would flash in the virtual area for a few
seconds immediately following the end of the subject’s actual wait time. (See Figure 12
for a visualization of the open waiting area that subjects experienced.) After the wait was
complete, we asked subjects to rate the waiting experience for their server from very poor
(coded as 1) to very good (coded as 5). In our analysis, we only included subjects who
made a correct identification of the image and who passed a comprehension check of the
experiment. See Section A.8 for more details on Experiment 2.
Figure 12: Snapshot of the virtual waiting area subjects experienced in Experiment 3. For
experiments with the progress bar, it is shown here in pink. The image to check incentive
compatibility of subjects flashed at the end of the wait in the designated box outlined in
blue.
Results. Our results are shown in Table 11. First, our results show that subjects are less
satisfied waiting for 160 seconds versus 100 seconds as one would expect longer waits to be
more painful than shorter waits. Second, we found that the progress bar did not significantly
impact satisfaction although we acknowledge that the coefficient could lack significance due
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Table 10: Number of subjects per condition in the schedule time experiment
100 Seconds 160 Seconds
Subjects (795) No Bar Bar No Bar Bar
On-time Finish 59 64 64 70
Early Finish 69 67 71 63
Late Finish 70 64 68 66
to sample size limitations (see Section A.7 for a power analysis we conducted). Finally, we
observe that subjects had a significant decline in satisfaction for late finishes versus on-time
finishes. Early finishes (versus on-time finishes) were not significantly different with respect
to satisfaction.
Discussion. We were able to find support for Hypothesis 4. Subject satisfaction was
negatively impacted by wait times that concluded after an estimated wait time (versus an
on-time finish). In addition, early finishes did not improve satisfaction relative to on-time
finishes. Thus, our results provide evidence that prospect theory may be applicable to
how customers in queues with scheduled appointment times experience exceeding and not
exceeding their budgeted wait times.
We find in our observational study that providing customers with more information about
their waits (such as anticipated delays) can help to improve customer satisfaction. Informa-
tion on anticipated delays can help to increase the amount of time that customers budget for
their wait, thus helping to reduce the impact of a perceived loss of time. In addition, service
providers could consider building in reasonable buffers into the expected wait time commu-
nicated to customers. For example, suppose the hospital that we study estimates that one
hour is the average amount of time needed to get a patient from reception to the operating
room with a standard deviation of 7.5 minutes (approximately Normally distributed). The
hospital could consider asking patients to arrive one hour and fifteen minutes prior to the
scheduled procedure time and only have about five percent of patients receive the procedure
after the scheduled procedure time (versus 50 percent if the hospital asks patients to arrive
one hour prior to the scheduled procedure time). Of course, this strategy would come at a
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Table 11: Results for the schedule time experiment
DV: Satisfaction (1-Very Poor to 5-Very Good) OLS
Early Finish (vs. On-time Finish) -0.069
(0.143)
Late Finish (vs. On-time Finish) -0.553***
(0.149)
160 Seconds (vs. 100 Seconds) -0.476***
(0.146)
Bar (vs. No Bar) -0.142
(0.155)
Early Finish x 160 Seconds 0.246
(0.211)
Late Finish x 160 Seconds 0.187
(0.203)
Early Finish x Bar 0.209
(0.208)
Late Finish x Bar -0.208
(0.228)
160 Seconds x Bar 0.304
(0.219)
Early Finish x 160 Seconds x Bar -0.329
(0.300)







Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
cost of having patients arrive earlier to the hospital, but the overall impact on satisfaction
could increase through greatly reducing the number of patients who experience perceived
losses of time.
3.8. Conclusion
In our study, we connect customer satisfaction data with timestamps of the customer’s
movement through a service process with two buffer locations. In order to identify whether
customers experience faster declines in one of the buffer locations in our observational data,
we use a 2SLS approach to overcome endogeneity with the wait time in the second buffer
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location (pre-op). Our novel instrument, PATIENTSAHEAD, relies on appointment
scheduling of patients as an exogenous shock to wait times in the second buffer thus ad-
dressing bias in our regression estimation. We provide empirical evidence that customers
care about buffer location: we show that customers in the second buffer (pre-op) experience
faster declines in satisfaction. In an experiment, we infer that patients may be less happy
in the second buffer due to the clinical and/or emotional intensity patients may experience
in that buffer.
We also find evidence in our observational study that queue discipline affects customer
satisfaction in shared, transparent waiting areas where the server assignment of other cus-
tomers is unobserved. Our experimental data suggests that customers are unhappy when
they observe other customers entering a waiting area after them but entering service before
them, despite not know who will serve these other customers.
Finally, our results suggest that customers may be negatively impacted by waits that con-
clude after a scheduled appointment time. However, customers may not have an equivalent
increase in satisfaction when their actual waits conclude before a scheduled appointment
time.
Our study demonstrates that when businesses manage queues in which customers wait
in multiple locations, managers should first consider evaluating the relative disutility of
waiting in each location. Resources should then be focused on areas of the queue with
higher disutility. For example, music and television are classic examples of wait time fillers
that can help to mitigate wait disutility, and newer technology such as iPads could also
achieve the desired effect.
In addition, our results suggest that managers should pay attention to queues where cus-
tomers wait in transparent, open areas with others. In these situations, customers are likely
to be disappointed if they perceive others cutting in line even if they are not necessar-
ily waiting for the same server. To decrease transparency in these queues, businesses can
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consider investing in technology such as customer paging apps which work with customer
phones and do not restrict customers to staying in the transparent waiting area.
Finally, our study suggests that managers should try to mitigate the negative impact of
delays from scheduled appointment times on customer satisfaction. In particular, initiatives
that aim to prevent customers from experiencing a delay from schedule may be worthy of
consideration (e.g., initiatives that create a larger buffer time between a customer’s arrival
and their scheduled appointment time). In addition, managers may consider interventions




A.1. Serving Democracy: Supporting Information Text
A.1.1. Data Sources
logVotersPerPW
Florida Division of Elections provides information on the number of active regis-
tered voters by county for each election (see https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/
data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/bookclosing/). Election Adminis-
tration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the number of poll workers by
county from question D3 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/
election-administration-voting-survey/).
PctWhite/PctDemocrat/PctNoParty
Florida Division of Elections provides information on the number of active regis-
tered voters by county for each election (see https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/
data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/bookclosing/). Florida Division
of Elections provides information on the racial and political party composition of active reg-
istered voters by county for each election (see https://dos.myflorida.com/elections/
data-statistics/voter-registration-statistics/bookclosing/).
logAbsentBallotsPerPP
Election Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the num-
ber of Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voters Act (UOCAVA) voters who
voted absentee, Federal Write-in Absentee Ballots (FWAB), and domestic civilian absentee
voters from question F1 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/
election-administration-voting-survey/). Election Administration Voting Sur-
vey provides county-level information on the number of polling places in an elec-




Election Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the num-
ber of ballots cast at an early vote center from question F1 or equivalent (see https://
www.eac.gov/research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/). Elec-
tion Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the number of
polling places in an election from question D2 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.gov/
research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/).
logEDBallotsPerPP
Election Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the num-
ber of ballots cast on Election Day from question F1 or equivalent (see https://
www.eac.gov/research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/). Elec-
tion Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the number of
polling places in an election from question D2 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.gov/
research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/).
logProvBallotsPerPP
Election Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the number
of provisional ballots cast in an election from question E1 or equivalent (see https://
www.eac.gov/research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/). Elec-
tion Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on the number of
polling places in an election from question D2 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.gov/
research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/).
PollDiff
Election Administration Voting Survey provides county-level information on poll worker
recruitment difficulty in an election from question D5 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.
gov/research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/).
HousePrice
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis collects county-level house price data through its “All-
Transactions House Price Index” in the FRED database (see https://fred.stlouisfed.
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org/). The All-Transactions House Price Index was only available for 56 out of 67 counties.
For the 11 counties missing data, we imputed the index based on the average of the housing
indexes from adjacent counties.
logMedInc
U.S. Census Bureau collects county-level information on income in the past 12 months
and publishes its 5-year estimates in report ID S1901 (see https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/acs/). The U.S. Census only reports median income for all counties in
Florida from 2009 and onward. We use the 2009 median incomes as a proxy for 2008.
logPeoplePerSqMile
Florida Office of Economic and Demographic Research publishes county-level information on
population estimates used for calculating revenue sharing (see http://www.edr.state.fl.
us/Content/population-demographics/data/index-floridaproducts.cfm). U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau published information on the total square mileage in a county in 2010 (see
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/note/US/LND110210).
UseDRE
Verified Voting Foundation publishes polling place equipment information by county (see
https://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/about-vvf/). See below for how we im-
pute missing data for the 2010 election.
Pct65Plus
U.S. Census Bureau collects county-level information on age and publishes its 5-year esti-
mates in report ID S0101 (see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/)
A.1.2. Multiple Imputation Methodology
Predicting PollDiff
We use the following as predictors of PollDiff in counties: total active registered voters,
male-to-female ratio, percentage of the population with a Bachelor’s degree or higher, me-
dian age, median income, percentage Democrats, urban sprawl (people per square mile),
political activeness (Election Day turnout percent) (Kimball et al. (2009); Burden and Mi-
lyo (2015)). We also use past values of PollDiff within a county as a predictor. Gender and
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age data is from the U.S. Census Bureau report ID S0101 (see https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/acs/). Educational attainment data is from the U.S. Census Bureau
report ID S1501 (see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/). Election Day
turnout data is calculated from the number of ballots cast on Election Day divided by the
total number of active registered voters.
Predicting UseDRE
If a county used (or did not use) DREs during both the 2008 and 2012 elections, then we
assume they would have used (or not used) DREs during the 2010 election. There are 56
counties for which we infer their 2010 usage in that manner. For the remaining 11 counties,
we perform multiple imputation in which we randomly assigned each county to either use
DREs or not use DREs across 10 imputations.
Imputing Results
We impute the regression coefficients and standard errors per Rubin (2004) with adjusted
degrees of freedom suggested in Barnard and Rubin (1999) and 10 imputations based on
guidance from White et al. (2011).
A.1.3. Famighetti et al. (2014) Poll Worker Result Calculation with Percentage of White
Voters
Famighetti et al. (2014) do not explicitly examine the relationship between the percentage
of white registered voters and the number of Election Day eligible voters per poll worker in
their study (i.e., they look at black, Latino, and other minority registered voters). However,
using their data and regression methodology, we were able to examine this relationship by
regressing the number of Election Day eligible voters per poll worker on the percentage of
white registered voters in each precinct and included county fixed effects. To convert this
regression estimate into a percentage (0.26%, as reported in our results), we divided the
regression estimate by the mean number of Election Day eligible voters per poll worker in
the data.
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A.1.4. Robustness Check Descriptions
TimeFE
We replace the variable Presidential and the linear time trend with time fixed effects and
include exogenous dummy variables for election years 2010 through 2016 (Election2010,
Election2012, Election2014, Election2016 ).
NoLag
We remove both lags of the dependent variable.
PctNoParty
We include the control PctNoParty, the percentage of active registered voters who had no
political party affiliation.
Shelby
We include an exogenous variable, ShelbyCounties which equals 1 in the 2014 and 2016
elections and zero otherwise for those counties that were effected by the 2013 Supreme
Court decision Shelby County v. Holder.
AltProxy
Instead of the contemporaneous forecast turnout proxies, we use the second lag of each
variable (to match the previous election of the same type, midterm or presidential) and we
eliminate the first lag of VotersPerPW because it is not significant in our main results.
ParsInstr
We examine a more parsimonious instrument model in which for all endogenous regressors,
we use only the most recent election lag or lags as instruments that correct the first difference
for endogeneity and pass our 2SLS F-test.
A.1.5. Average Waiting Time Simulation
We use three different methods to measure the impact of a change in the percentage of
Democrats on the average wait time. The first adjusts the average number of check-in
stations in response to changes in PctDemocrat, leaving all other parameters constant. Let
Q be the initial number of check-in stations. Assuming that the average change in check-in
stations per polling place is proportional to the average change in poll workers per polling
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place, the average number of check-in stations after the change is
Q/eβ̂1P
where β̂1 is our estimate for the change in voters per poll worker (β̂1 = 0.028), and P is
the percentage change in Democrats in a county. To overcome the integer constraint on
the number of voting resources (e.g., it is not possible to reduce the number of check-in
stations across all polling locations by 0.1, but it is possible to reduce the number of check-
in-stations in 10% of polling locations), we presume that the fraction ρ of polling places has













For most changes δ = 1, but it is possible that a larger change in voting resources is needed.
With our first measure we let W1 be the new average waiting time due to a P percent
change in Democrats
W1 = ρΩ(675, 2− δ, 4) + (1− ρ) Ω(675, 2− δ + 1, 4)
where Ω(v, c, s) is the simulated average wait time for a polling place with v voters, c
check-in stations, and s voting stations.
The second method is analogous to the first except now the number of voting stations is
reduced:
W2 = ρΩ(675, 2, 4− δ) + (1− ρ) Ω(675, 2, 4− δ + 1)
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)
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A.2. Serving Democracy: Additional Figures
Figure 13: Percent of non-white citizens who registered to vote by state. Data taken
from U.S. Census Bureau reports on the voting and registration for states by race (see
https://www.census.gov/topics/public-sector/voting/data/tables.html).
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Figure 14: Change in Florida’s voting equipment usage over time courtesy of the Verified
Voting Foundation (figure created courtesy of https://mapchart.net/)
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A.3. Serving Democracy: Additional Tables
Table 12: Summary statistics for key variables across Florida’s 67 counties and the 2008 to
2016 general elections
Voters Pct Absent Early ED Prov Person
Per Dem Pct Ballots Ballots Ballots Ballots Poll PerSq House Med Use Pct
Statistic PW ocrat White PerPP PerPP PerPP PerPP Diff* Mile Price Inc DRE* 65Plus
Mean 235.64 44.46 78.51 320.24 406.69 540.69 3.64 3.41 346.18 142.23 44243 0.72 18.51
Std. Dev. 93.11 14.60 14.09 229.48 295.14 223.86 4.02 1.05 531.99 23.53 7648 0.45 6.84
Minimum 79.70 19.42 18.37 30.88 16.00 142.69 0.00 1 9.76 97.55 29642 0 7.90
Maximum 581.74 88.38 95.80 1251.83 1591.49 1162.39 32.09 5 3486.37 214.61 69523 1 53.10
25th%ile 168.58 33.20 72.42 148.80 187.94 342.29 1.00 3 46.12 124.44 37778 0 13.80
50th%ile 220.01 42.28 82.84 257.12 315.44 543.90 2.22 3 166.57 137.22 43787 1 17.10
75th%ile 280.40 54.22 87.29 428.34 549.50 707.63 5.24 4 413.12 159.29 49135 1 21.70
*Calculated based on one of the ten imputations for the variable
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Table 13: Main regression specification checks
Model Specification Checks (Note: 4ε̂i,t = 4ε̂i,t −4 ˆεi,t−1) 1-Step 2-Step
Number of instruments: 59
H0: No correlation between 4ε̂i,t and 4 ˆεi,t−1 | Max p-value among imputations: 0.008 0.014
H0: No correlation between 4ε̂i,t and 4 ˆεi,t−2 | Min p-value among imputations: 0.876 0.813
H0: No correlation between 4ε̂i,t and 4 ˆεi,t−3 | Min p-value among imputations: 0.728 0.766
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions | Min p-value among imputations: 0.143
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Table 14: F-statistics resulting from the first-stage regression of the first differences of the
covariate at time t (pooled across county and election years) on the lagged instrument
candidate(s) for all endogenous covariates.
General Election Years: 2008 to 2016









PollDiff† minimum among all imputa-
tions
t-1 73.53
*The first difference of logVotersPerPWt−2 (i.e., logVotersPerPWt−2 – logVotersPerPWt−3) is fully identified by the two
lags used as instruments so we report the minimum F-statistic resulting from the first-stage, pooled county regression of
the first difference of the second lag on each individual lagged instrument candidate.
†We conducted the F-test for all 10 imputed cases for PollDiff and report the minimum F-statistic.
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Table 15: Main regression results
General Election Years: 2008 to 2016 | Counties: 67
DV: logVotersPerPW FE† 1-Step† 2-Step‡
PctDemocrat 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.028**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.012)
PctWhite -0.014 0.004 0.018
(0.012) (0.024) (0.036)
logVotersPerPWt−1 -0.033 -0.006 0.016
(0.061) (0.055) (0.071)
logVotersPerPWt−2 0.094 0.128* 0.150
(0.058) (0.073) (0.108)
logAbsentBallotsPerPP 0.174*** 0.205** 0.181**
(0.061) (0.089) (0.086)
logEarlyBallotsPerPP 0.047 0.056 0.020
(0.058) (0.094) (0.105)
logEDBallotsPerPP 0.238*** 0.368*** 0.385***
(0.088) (0.123) (0.143)
logProvBallotstPerPP -0.013 -0.068** -0.071***
(0.017) (0.028) (0.023)
PollDiff -0.002 -0.023 -0.011
(0.012) (0.020) (0.023)
logPersonPerSqMile -0.275 -0.454 -0.419
(0.381) (0.425) (0.554)
HousePrice -0.001* -0.001* -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
logMedInc -0.188 -0.042 -0.015
(0.269) (0.304) (0.360)
UseDRE 0.006 -0.028 -0.028
(0.035) (0.042) (0.042)
Pct65Plus -0.004 -0.004 -0.007
(0.006) (0.007) (0.009)
Presidential -0.170*** -0.136** -0.077
(0.044) (0.061) (0.066)





†Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
‡Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors reported in
parentheses
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Table 16: Robustness check results
General Election Years: 2008 to 2016 | Counties: 67
DV: logVotersPerPW (1)TimeFE‡ (2)NoLag‡ (3)PctNoParty‡ (4)Shelby‡ (5)AltProxy‡ (6)ParsInstr‡
PctDemocrat 0.029** 0.030** 0.027** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.035***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
PctWhite 0.024 0.021 0.017 0.023 0.013 0.032























logVotersPerPW lags t-1/t-2 No t-1/t-2 t-1/t-2 t-2 t-1/t-2
Presidential + Time trend No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other standard covariates Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
‡ Windmeijer (2005) corrected standard errors reported in parentheses
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Table 17: Robustness specification checks
Model Specification Checks (Note: 4ε̂i,t = 4ε̂i,t −4 ˆεi,t−1) TimeFE NoLag PctNoParty Shelby AltProxy ParsInstr
Number of instruments: 61 51 67 60 59 43
H0: No correlation between 4ε̂i,t and 4 ˆεi,t−1 | Max p-value among imputations: 0.011 0.006 0.017 0.015 0.013 0.042
H0: No correlation between 4ε̂i,t and 4 ˆεi,t−2 | Min p-value among imputations: 0.565 0.5 0.656 0.805 0.544 0.762
H0: No correlation between 4ε̂i,t and 4 ˆεi,t−3 | Min p-value among imputations: 0.873 0.818 0.734 0.808 0.22 0.646
Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions | Min p-value among imputations: 0.207 0.254 0.186 0.157 0.159 0.178
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Table 18: F-statistics resulting from the first-stage regression of the first differences of the
covariate at time t (pooled across county and election years) on the lagged instrument
candidate(s) for the PctNoParty covariate and for the endogenous covariates with new
instruments in the ParsInstr robustness check
General Election Years: 2008 to 2016










Table 19: Base simulation inputs
Simulation parameter Selection/Value




Voting technology paper ballot +
optical scanner
Time to check in (minutes) Stewart III (2015) 2
Time to complete a ballot (minutes) Stewart III (2015) 5
Time to scan ballot (minutes) Stewart III (2015) 0.5
% voters unable to check-in (observed %
of provisional ballots)
1%
% of voters arriving before polls open (default
for simultation)
1.20%
Same day voter registration no
Expected number of voters 675
Number of check-in stations 2
Number of voting stations 4
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A.4. Democracy on the Line: Supporting Information Text
A.4.1. Data Sources
logWait
Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) publishes its survey results in each elec-
tion (see https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/). Note, there was one respondent in the 2008
CCES survey who reported a wait time greater than an hour but then wrote “got early
in the morning at 6am” when specifying his wait time. We excluded this observation
from the analysis. Survey of the Performance of the Performance of American Elections
(SPAE) publishes its survey results in each election (see https://dataverse.harvard.
edu/dataverse/SPAE). One respondent in the 2008 SPAE survey reported a wait time
greater than an hour but wrote “I got to there an hour before they opened but once the
polls opened I waited und” when specifying his wait time. We excluded this observation
from the analysis.
PctWhite
Georgia’s Secretary of State publishes information by county on the number of white
registered voters and the number of total registered voters in each election (see http:
//sos.ga.gov/index.php/Elections/voter_turn_out_by_demographics). South Car-
olina Election Commission provided voter registration tallies by race as of the following
dates: January 1, 2006; October 25, 2008; October 26, 2012; and October 28, 2016.
PctDem
Georgia’s Secretary of State publishes information on current and past elec-
tion results (see http://sos.ga.gov/index.php/Elections/current_and_past_
elections_results). South Carolina Election Commission publishes infor-
mation on current and past election results (see https://www.scvotes.org/
election-returns-primaries-and-general-elections-statewide).
RegVoters
Election Administration Voting Survey (EAVS) provides county-level information on the




Georgia’s Secretary of State publishes information by county on the number of regis-
tered voters and the number who voted in each election (see http://sos.ga.gov/index.
php/Elections/voter_turn_out_by_demographics). South Carolina Election Commis-
sion publishes information by county on the number of registered voters and the number
who voted in each election (see https://www.scvotes.org/data/voter-history.html).
EDTurnout
EAVS provides county-level information on the number of ballots cast on Election
Day from question F1 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/
election-administration-voting-survey/). (Note, for Georgia, the 2016 EAVS sur-
vey data for section F listed McDuffie County and McIntosh County twice and did not
list Meriwether County or Miller County. However, the responses to the questions in
the survey for the second instances of McDuffie and McIntosh counties are different from
the first instances. Based on data from other years in the survey, we determined that
the second instance of McDuffie County was Meriwether County and the second instance
of McIntosh County was Miller County.) EAVS also provides county-level information
on the number of active registered voters from question A3 or equivalent (see https:
//www.eac.gov/research-and-data/election-administration-voting-survey/).
logPplPerSqMile
U.S. Census Bureau publishes information by county on the intercensal estimates of
the resident population (see https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/
popest/intercensal-2000-2010-counties.html for 2000 to 2010 estimates and report
ID PEPANNRES at https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/ for 2010 to 2016
estimates). U.S. Census Bureau also publishes information on the total square mileage in
a county in 2010 (see https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/note/US/LND110210).
86
logMedInc
U.S. Census Bureau collects county-level information on median household income
in its Small Area Income and Poverty Estimates (see https://www.census.gov/
programs-surveys/saipe.html).
Pct65Plus
U.S. Census Bureau collects county-level information on age and publishes its estimates in
report ID S0101 (see https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/). For all coun-
ties which an estimate was not available in 2006, the 2008 estimate was used.
PollPlaces
EAVS provides county-level information on the number of polling places in an elec-
tion from question D2 or equivalent (see https://www.eac.gov/research-and-data/
election-administration-voting-survey/).
White, Male, Age, Dem, Ind, HighInc, College
CCES provides demographic information on survey respondents (see https://cces.gov.
harvard.edu/).
PctDriveAlone
U.S. Census Bureau collects county-level information on the percent of the population that
drives to work alone and publishes its estimates in report ID S0801 (see https://www.
census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/). Data was not available in 2008, so 2009 data was
used as a proxy.
A.4.2. County-Level Analysis of Predictors of Polling Place Closures
To analyze the predictors of polling place closures in Georgia, we first defined a closure
as occurring in a county if the number of polling places declined in the 2016 presidential
election relative to the 2008 presidential election according to the EAVS data. We created
a dependent variable, Closure, which equaled 1 if county i experienced closures in the 2016
election (relative to 2008) and 0 otherwise. See Fig.15 for all counties that experienced
closures according to our definition.
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We then ran a cross-sectional logistic regression (see Eq.A.1) using predictors of closures
in 2016 (relative to 2008) specified in Table 26 based on data election managers could
reasonably observe prior to the 2016 election. Note that we introduce a new variable,
PctDriveAlone, as a predictor which is the percentage of the population which drives to
work alone. We believe that public transportation accessibility could play a role in whether
counties close polling places. The results of our analysis can be seen in Table 27.
Closurei =γ0 + γ1logMedInc16i + γ2Pct∆MedInc0816i + γ3PctWhite12i+
γ4Pct∆PctWhite0812i + γ5PctDem12i + γ6Pct∆PctDem0812i+
γ7logRegV oters16i + γ8Pct∆RegV oters0816i + γ9Turnout12i+
γ10Pct∆Turnout0812i + γ11EDTurnout12i + γ12Pct∆EDTurnout0812i+





Figure 15: Where polling place closures occurred in Georgia counties in the 2016 election
(relative to the 2008 election) (figure created courtesy of https://mapchart.net/)
A.5. Democracy on the Line: Additional Figures
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A.6. Democracy on the Line: Additional Tables
Table 20: Total number of polling places in Georgia and South Carolina for the 2006 to
2016 elections as reported in the EAVS








Table 21: Summary of the dependent variable and controls across elections 2006, 2008,
2012, and 2016
Statistic Wait PctWhite PctDem RegVoters Turnout EDTurnout PplPerSqMi Income Pct65Plus
Mean 21.78 64.01 42.68 185610 68.25 40.51 798.05 51306 11.91
Std. Dev. 34.18 18.15 15.97 171402 10.44 10.87 830.67 11878 3.58
Minimum 1 12.69 12.21 1743 34.77 14.27 9.67 25633 2.60
Maximum 360 99.44 82.70 595979 85.48 68.90 2753.89 101804 33.10
25th%ile 5 48.41 31.76 49861 65.84 32.74 172.26 41543 9.10
50th%ile 5 68.23 39.37 112696 71.66 39.49 403.74 50427 11.50
75th%ile 20 77.90 53.16 316917 75.05 46.63 1694.83 58167 13.90
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Table 22: Voting restrictions implemented in Georgia and South Carolina in the recent past
according to Brennan Center for Justice (Weiser and Feldman (2018))
State Voting Restrictions
GA “No match, no vote” limit on access to voter registration (2017 law)
Reduced early voting period (2010 law)
Documentary proof of citizenship to register (2009 law)
Strict voter ID requirement (2006 law)
SC Voter ID requirement (2011 law, mitigated after lawsuit)
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Table 23: Regression results
DV: logWait Base CCES/SPAE Presidential IndControls VICEClosures CountyFE
Treated -0.280 -0.332 -0.195 -0.286 -0.179 0.038
(0.221) (0.214) (0.218) (0.218) (0.245) (0.373)
Election2006 -1.206*** -1.268*** -1.255*** -1.527*** -0.232
(0.322) (0.292) (0.323) (0.407) (0.459)
Election2008 0.970*** 1.006*** 1.030*** 0.956*** 1.109*** 0.983***
(0.145) (0.140) (0.146) (0.145) (0.152) (0.207)
Election2016 -0.423** -0.403** -0.434** -0.452** -0.534*** -0.738***
(0.178) (0.157) (0.184) (0.178) (0.178) (0.204)
Treated x Election2006 -0.039 -0.022 -0.023 -0.144 0.116
(0.232) (0.229) (0.229) (0.256) (0.313)
Treated x Election2008 0.016 -0.154 -0.023 0.008 0.078 0.018
(0.171) (0.162) (0.178) (0.175) (0.177) (0.221)
Treated x Election2016 0.578*** 0.552*** 0.593*** 0.588*** 0.583** 0.862***
(0.197) (0.178) (0.203) (0.198) (0.231) (0.197)
County-level controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual-level controls No No No Yes No No
County fixed effects No No No No No Yes
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.145 0.149 0.164 0.150 0.152 0.210
Number of observations 5091 6235 4195 5091 4459 5091
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors clustered by county in parentheses
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Table 24: Number of logWait observations by state and election year for the CCES and
SPAE surveys
State Survey 2006 2008∗ 2010† 2012 2014‡ 2016
Georgia CCES 617 541 0 1093 n.a. 1201
SPAE n.a. 344 0 170 n.a. 163
South Carolina CCES 279 279 0 559 n.a. 522
SPAE n.a. 156 0 160 n.a. 161
∗In 2008, SPAE sampled an additional 200 registered voters in Georgia by phone
†CCES did not collect wait time observations in 2010 and SPAE was not conducted
‡2014 election was not applicable to our study
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Table 25: Summary of the individual-level controls across elections 2006, 2008, 2012, and
2016
Statistic White Male Age Dem Ind HighInc College
Mean 0.72 0.47 51.28 0.31 0.28 0.18 0.73
Std. Dev. 0.45 0.5 15.19 0.46 0.45 0.39 0.44
Minimum 0 0 18 0 0 0 0
Maximum 1 1 92 1 1 1 1
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Table 26: Predictors of polling place closures between 2008 and 2016
Predictors Description
logMedInc16 logMedInc in 2016
Pct∆MedInc0816 Percentage change in non-logged MedInc between 2008 and 2016
PctWhite12 PctWhite in 2012
Pct∆PctWhite0812 Percentage change in PctWhite between 2008 and 2012
PctDem12 Contemporaneous values of PctDem in 2012
Pct∆PctDem0812 Percentage change in contemporaneous values of PctDem between 2008 and 2012
logRegVoters16 Log of RegVoters in 2016
Pct∆RegVoters0816 Percentage change in RegVoters between 2008 and 2016
Turnout12 Turnout in 2012
Pct∆Turnout0812 Percentage change in Turnout between 2008 and 2012
EDTurnout12 EDTurnout in 2012
Pct∆EDTurnout0812 Percentage change in EDTurnout between 2008 and 2012
logPplPerSqMile16 logPplPerSqMile in 2016
Pct∆PplPerSqMile0816 Percentage change in non-logged PplPerSqMile between 2008 and 2016
Pct65Plus16 Pct65Plus in 2016
Pct∆Pct65Plus0816 Percentage change in Pct65Plus between 2008 and 2016
PctDriveAlone16 PctDriveAlone in 2016
Pct∆PctDriveAlone0916 Percentage change in PctDriveAlone between 2009 and 2016
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Table 27: County-level analysis of predictors of polling place closures in the 2016 presidential








































Number of observations 159
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
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A.7. Drivers of Customer Satisfaction in a Tandem Queue: Power Analysis
A.7.1. Location of Wait vs. Wait Disutility
The coefficient on Long 2nd Wait was not shown to be significant in Table 7. In a power
analysis, we set Long 2nd Wait as the treatment group and Short 2nd Wait as the con-
trol. We use the following parameters for a two-tailed test with zero covariates and 184
observations across the Long 2nd Wait and Short 2nd Wait conditions (55% assigned to
treatment):
• Alpha level (α)=0.05
• Power (1-β)=0.80
We find a minimum detectable effect size (MDES) of 0.417 standard deviation units of the
outcome. Using the observed standard deviation of the outcome across the two conditions
(0.996), we estimate the MDES in satisfaction units to be 0.416. With the observed effect
size on Long 2nd Wait being -0.290 (in satisfaction units), it is possible that the sample size
was not sufficiently large to detect a significant effect in our study. We estimate needing
roughly 1,250 subjects to detect an effect size of 0.290 satisfaction units.
A.7.2. Scheduled Wait Times
The coefficient on Bar was not shown to be significant in Table 11. In a power analysis, we
set Bar as the treatment group and No Bar as the control. We use the following parameters
for a two-tailed test with zero covariates and 795 observations across the Bar and No Bar
conditions (50% assigned to treatment):
• Alpha level (α)=0.05
• Power (1-β)=0.80
We find a minimum detectable effect size (MDES) of 0.199 standard deviation units of the
outcome. Using the observed standard deviation of the outcome across the two conditions
(0.920), we estimate the MDES in satisfaction units to be 0.183. With the observed effect
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size on Bar being -0.142 (in satisfaction units), it is possible that the sample size was not
sufficiently large to detect a significant effect in our study. We estimate needing roughly
2,500 subjects to detect an effect size of 0.142 satisfaction units.
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A.8. Drivers of Customer Satisfaction in a Tandem Queue: Materials for the Exper-
iments
A.8.1. Sounds Pre-Experiment Materials
Instruction Text Highlights
In this experiment, we are researching customer experiences in service settings. The exper-
iment should take about 15 minutes of your time and you will be compensated $0.80 plus
any bonuses you accrue (up to $1.20). An overview of the experiment and instructions will
follow. The tasks will solicit information on your experience in the experiment and also
demographic information on yourself (e.g., gender, race, age range, education level, income
level, employment status, and state of residence). No other identifying information will
be obtained. All information will be stored in a secure, password-protected data storage
facility.
You may abandon the experiment at any time, however in order to receive any payment
for your participation in the experiment, you must complete all tasks according to the
directions provided. Therefore, please ensure you follow all directions in the experiment
carefully. If certain tasks are not completed according to the directions, your participation
in the experiment may be terminated.
Please note that in some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what
the study is about before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the
study in a general way, but we can’t explain the real purpose of the study until after you
complete these tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study,
what we are looking at, and any other information you should know about this study. You
will also be able to ask any questions you might have about the study’s purpose and the
tasks you did. Though we may not be able to explain the real purpose of the study until
after you complete the tasks, there are no additional risks to those that have been described
in this consent form.
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In this experiment, you will listen to six sound files. Each file will contain ambient sound
along with two spoken words. The two spoken words will be inserted at random points
in the sound file. When the sound file concludes, we will ask you to rate the pleasantness
or unpleasantness of each sound. We will also ask you to correctly identify the spoken
words following the conclusion of each sound file, so feel free to write the words down while
you wait. Finally, we will also ask you for demographic information as mentioned in the
disclaimer.
To receive the base payment ($0.80) for the experiment, all tasks must be completed. To
receive any bonus payments, spoken words must be correctly identified. For each spoken
word correctly identified, you will receive a bonus of $0.10. Thus, if all spoken words are
correctly identified, you will receive a bonus of $1.20 and a total payment of $2.00 upon
completion of the experiment.
Please note that once you are in the listening portion of the experiment, sound files will
play automatically and you WILL NOT be able to stop, rewind, or fast-forward the sound
file. So please proceed to the next portion of the experiment to make sure your headphones
or speakers are set up properly for listening.
You will need to use speakers or headphones to listen to sounds. Before starting the exper-
iment, ensure your speakers or headphones are on and the volume is at a comfortable level.
Press the play button below to hear the word ”testing” at the volume level we will be using
throughout the experiment. Adjust the volume on your device so that the sound level is
comfortable and the word is audible. Once the sound is complete and you have something
handy to write down the spoken words (if desired), click on the → button to begin the
experiment.
Comprehension Check Questions
Correct answers in bold.
• Each sound file will be composed of ambient sound and two spoken words randomly
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inserted into the sound file. (True/False)
• To remember the spoken words in each file, I can write them down. (True/False)
• For each spoken word I correctly identify in the audio files, I will receive a bonus
payment of $0.10. Thus, if I complete all tasks in the experiment and correctly
identify all the spoken words, I will receive a total payment of $2.00. (True/False)
• Once you are in the listening portion of the experiment, sound files will NOT play
automatically. (True/False)
• You will be able to pause each sound file once the sound file begins playing.
(True/False)
• You will not be able to rewind or fast-forward the sound file once the sound file begins
playing. (True/False)
Incentive Compatibility Questions
Correct answers in bold. Each subject had the same two spoken words in each of the six
sound files.
• What was the first spoken word in the [Baby] sound file? (university, zebra, statue,
state)
• What was the second spoken word in the [Baby] sound file? (giraffe, book, picture,
apple)
• What was the first spoken word in the [Alarm] sound file? (iceberg, clock, bell,
communication)
• What was the second spoken word in the [Alarm] sound file? (winter, spring, summer,
fall)
• What was the first spoken word in the [Lawnmower] sound file? (elephant, vocabu-
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lary, river, stone)
• What was the second spoken word in the [Lawnmower] sound file? (breakfast, lunch,
dinner, dessert)
• What was the first spoken word in the [Bells] sound file? (operation, frame, envelope,
America)
• What was the second spoken word in the [Bells] sound file? (theory, economics,
photograph, treadmill)
• What was the first spoken word in the [Creek] sound file? (probability, information,
tale, tree)
• What was the second spoken word in the [Creek] sound file? (air conditioner, library,
machine, guava)
• What was the first spoken word in the [Piano] sound file? (angel, conversation,
approach, data)
• What was the second spoken word in the [Piano] sound file? (exercise, hat, orange,
figurine)
Satisfaction Question
• How would you rate the pleasantness of the ambient sound? (Strongly unpleasant, Un-
pleasant, Somewhat unpleasant, Neither unpleasant or pleasant, Somewhat pleasant,
Pleasant, Strongly pleasant)
A.8.2. Experiment 1 Materials
Instruction Text Highlights
In this experiment, we are researching customer experiences in service settings and con-
ducting a two part demographic survey. The experiment should take about 10 minutes of
your time and you will be compensated $0.50 plus any bonuses you accrue (up to $1.00).
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An overview of the experiment and instructions will follow. The tasks will solicit demo-
graphic information on yourself (e.g., gender, race, age range, education level, income level,
employment status, and state of residence) in addition to information on your experience
in the experiment. No other identifying information will be obtained. All information will
be stored in a secure, password-protected data storage facility.
You may abandon the experiment at any time, however in order to receive any payment
for your participation in the experiment, you must complete all tasks according to the
directions provided. Therefore, please ensure you follow all directions in the experiment
carefully. If certain tasks are not completed according to the directions, your participation
in the experiment may be terminated.
Please note that in some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what
the study is about before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the
study in a general way, but we can’t explain the real purpose of the study until after you
complete these tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study,
what we are looking at, and any other information you should know about this study. You
will also be able to ask any questions you might have about the study’s purpose and the
tasks you did. Though we may not be able to explain the real purpose of the study until
after you complete the tasks, there are no additional risks to those that have been described
in this consent form.
In this experiment, you will wait to complete the first part of a demographic survey and
then wait again to complete the second part of a demographic survey. For each of the two
waits, you will listen to ambient sound along with two words that will be spoken. The two
words will be randomly spoken during your wait to ensure you focus on completing the
experiment in a timely manner. When your wait concludes, we will ask you to correctly
identify the spoken words, so feel free to write the words down while you wait.
To receive the base payment ($0.50) for the experiment, all tasks must be completed. To
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receive any bonus payments, spoken words must be correctly identified. For each spoken
word correctly identified, you will receive a bonus of $0.25. Thus, if all spoken words are
correctly identified, you will receive a bonus of $1.00 and a total payment of $1.50 upon
completion of the experiment. Because you will be listening to ambient sound and spoken
words during your two waits, please proceed to the next portion of the experiment to make
sure your headphones or speakers are set up properly for listening.
You will need to use speakers or headphones to listen to sounds. Before starting the ex-
periment, ensure your speakers or headphones are on and the volume is at a comfortable
level. Press the play button below to hear the word ”testing” at the volume level we will
be using throughout the experiment. Adjust the volume on your device so that the sound
level is comfortable and the word is audible.
Once the sound check is complete and you have something handy to write down the spoken
words (if desired), click on the → button to begin the experiment.
Comprehension Check Questions
Correct answers in bold.
• In this experiment, I will wait to take the first part of a demographic survey and then
I will wait again to take the second part of a demographic survey. (True/False)
• While waiting in each part of this experiment, I will listen to ambient sound and two
words which will be spoken at random times during my wait. (True/False)
• For each spoken word I correctly identify in the audio files, I will receive a bonus
payment of $0.25. Thus, if I complete all tasks in the experiment and correctly
identify all the spoken words, I will receive a total payment of $1.50. (True/False)
• While I am waiting to take either part of the demographic survey, I cannot write
down the spoken words that I hear in order to identify them once my wait concludes.
(True/False)
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• I will be able to predict the times at which I will hear the spoken words while waiting.
(True/False)
• If I do not correctly identify any of the spoken words in the experiment but I complete
all the tasks, I will receive a payment of $0.50. (True/False)
Incentive Compatibility Questions
Correct answers in bold. Each subject had the same two spoken words in the first and
second sound files.
• What was the first spoken word in the [first] sound file? (zebra, statue, information,
state)
• What was the second spoken word in the [first] sound file? (giraffe, library, apple,
picture)
• What was the first spoken word in the [second] sound file? (conversation, clock,
iceberg, book)
• What was the second spoken word in the [second] sound file? (university, winter, bell,
exercise)
Satisfaction Question
• How would you rate your overall waiting experience for both parts of the demographic
survey? (Very Poor, Poor, Fair, Good, Very Good)
A.8.3. Experiment 2 Materials
Instruction Text Highlights
In this experiment, we are researching customer experiences in service settings. The exper-
iment should take about 10 minutes of your time and you will be compensated $0.50 plus
any bonus you accrue (up to $1.00). An overview of the experiment and instructions will
follow. The tasks will solicit information on your experience in the experiment and also
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demographic information on yourself (e.g, gender, race, age range, education level, income
level, employment status, and state of residence). No other identifying information will
be obtained. All information will be stored in a secure, password-protected data storage
facility.
You may abandon the experiment at any time, however in order to receive any payment
for your participation in the experiment, you must complete all tasks according to the
directions provided. Therefore, please ensure you follow all directions in the experiment
carefully. If certain tasks are not completed according to the directions, your participation
in the experiment may be terminated.
Please note that in some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what
the study is about before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the
study in a general way, but we can’t explain the real purpose of the study until after you
complete these tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study,
what we are looking at, and any other information you should know about this study. You
will also be able to ask any questions you might have about the study’s purpose and the
tasks you did. Though we may not be able to explain the real purpose of the study until
after you complete the tasks, there are no additional risks to those that have been described
in this consent form.
In this experiment, you must complete a 1-question multiple choice quiz with one of three
quiz administrators. The three quiz administrators are assigned to one of three areas: math,
logic, and writing. Administrator 1 is responsible for administering the math quiz. Admin-
istrator 2 is responsible for administering the logic quiz. Administrator 3 is responsible for
administering the writing quiz. You are responsible for choosing the type of quiz you would
like to complete. The administrator in each area will be responsible for generating the quiz
question you will receive.
All participants in the experiment, including yourself, will first choose a specific quiz to
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take. You will then be assigned an available animal avatar (e.g., dog, cat, elephant, etc.) so
that you will be able to see yourself waiting along with all other participants (regardless of
the quiz/server they have chosen). All administrators will only process their participants
in the order that they arrive, and when it is your turn with your administrator, your avatar
will appear in the “NOW SERVING” box.
Before you can proceed to your administrator to take your quiz, you will be asked to identify
the animal avatar of the individual who was served immediately before you (if no one was
before you, this option will be present), so pay attention to who is being served before you.
For example, if a dog avatar proceeded into service immediately before you, we will ask
you to identify the dog avatar. If you correctly answer this question, you will receive a
$1.00 bonus payment bringing your total payment in the experiment to $1.50 if all tasks
are completed. Thus, feel free to write down information such as the names of the animal
avatars that proceed into service before you (e.g., tiger was first, lion was second, etc.).
After answering the question regarding the animal avatar that proceeded into service before
you, the server will take a moment to decide the question to administer on your quiz, and
then you will be taken to the quiz question in another screen. You will click on the answer
to the question you believe is correct, however you will not receive a bonus for a correct
quiz answer. Once the quiz is finished, you must answer some short questions about your
demographics.
Comprehension Check Questions
Correct answers in bold.
• Each of the three quiz administrators will be assigned to only one subject area: math,
logic, or writing; and you will be asked to choose only one type of quiz to complete
with one of the administrators. (True/False)
• My quiz administrator will not necessarily process his/her participants in the order
that they arrive. (True/False)
108
• Before proceeding into the waiting area for my quiz administrator, I will be assigned
an animal avatar that will allow me to see myself waiting for my administrator with
other participants (who may or may not be waiting for the same administrator) in
the experiment. (True/False)
• All experiment participants that you may see in the waiting area must be assigned to
the same quiz administrator. (True/False)
• When my wait is over and I am ready to proceed to a quiz administrator, I will be
asked to identify the animal avatar of the participant who was called for their quiz
immediately before me. (True/False)
• I may not write down any information regarding the animal avatars that proceeded
to their quiz administrator before me. (True/False)
• If I correctly identify the animal avatar of the participant who was called for their quiz
immediately before me, I will receive a bonus payment of $1.00, and upon completion
of the experiment, I will receive a total payment of $1.50. (True/False)
• You will receive an additional bonus payment if you answer the math, logic, or writing
quiz question correctly. (True/False)
Incentive Compatibility Questions
Correct answer in bold.
• What was the animal avatar that proceeded to service immediately before you [FIFO
Condition]? (Dog, Rabbit, Hippopotamus, Elephant, Cat, None of these)
• What was the animal avatar that proceeded to service immediately before you [Ad-
vance in Line Condition]? (Dog, Rabbit, Hippopotamus, Elephant, Cat, None of
these)
• What was the animal avatar that proceeded to service immediately before you [View
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Cuts in Line Condition]? (Dog, Rabbit, Hippopotamus, Elephant, Cat, None of
these)
Satisfaction Question
• How would you rate your waiting experience for your administrator? (Very poor,
Poor, Fair, Good, Very good)
A.8.4. Experiment 3 Materials (without Progress Bar
Instruction Text Highlights
In this experiment, we are researching customer experiences in service settings. The exper-
iment should take about 10 minutes of your time and you will be compensated $0.50 plus
any bonus you accrue (up to $1.00). An overview of the experiment and instructions will
follow. The tasks will solicit information on your experience in the experiment and also
demographic information on yourself (e.g, gender, race, age range, education level, income
level, employment status, and state of residence). No other identifying information will
be obtained. All information will be stored in a secure, password-protected data storage
facility.
You may abandon the experiment at any time, however in order to receive any payment
for your participation in the experiment, you must complete all tasks according to the
directions provided. Therefore, please ensure you follow all directions in the experiment
carefully. If certain tasks are not completed according to the directions, your participation
in the experiment may be terminated.
Please note that in some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what
the study is about before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the
study in a general way, but we can’t explain the real purpose of the study until after you
complete these tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study,
what we are looking at, and any other information you should know about this study. You
will also be able to ask any questions you might have about the study’s purpose and the
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tasks you did. Though we may not be able to explain the real purpose of the study until
after you complete the tasks, there are no additional risks to those that have been described
in this consent form.
In this experiment, you must wait to complete a customized demographic survey. Because
each survey is customized for a participant by a surveyor, you will be given a scheduled
waiting time since the surveyor may also be processing other participants in the experiment.
Because we want the surveyor to process as many experiment participants as possible, you
must pay attention in the waiting area. Your actual waiting time may be complete before
or after the scheduled time, so you must pay attention to when your wait ends. To help you
keep track of your actual wait time and scheduled wait time, a wait timer will be provided
like the one below. Your wait will end when your wait timer stops. To help you pay
attention in the waiting area, we will flash an image in a designated image area for a brief
time period immediately after your wait is complete (see the example below). Please feel
free to record what this image is. After clicking proceed, you will be asked to identify the
image correctly. If you identify the image correctly, you will receive a $1.00 bonus payment
bringing your total payment in the experiment to $1.50 if all tasks are completed. Please
click the → button when you are ready to begin the experiment.
Comprehension Check Questions
Correct answers in bold.
• In this experiment, you will receive a scheduled waiting time for the surveyor.
(True/False)
• Your actual waiting time for the surveyor will never be longer or shorter than the
scheduled waiting time. (True/False)
• Your actual waiting time will end when the wait timer stops. (True/False)
• When my wait is over and I am ready to proceed to the surveyor, I will be asked to
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identify the image that flashes briefly immediately following the end of my wait time.
(True/False)
• I may not write down any information regarding the image I must identify following
the end of my wait time. (True/False)
• If I correctly identify the image following the end of my wait time, I will receive a
bonus payment of $1.00, and upon completion of the experiment, I will receive a total
payment of $1.50. (True/False)
Incentive Compatibility Question
Correct answer in bold.
• What was the image that flashed for five seconds when your wait was complete? (Dog,
Rabbit, Hippopotamus, Elephant, Cat, None of these)
Satisfaction Question
• How would you rate your waiting experience for your surveyor? (Very poor, Poor,
Fair, Good, Very good)
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A.8.5. Experiment 3 Materials (with Progress Bar
Instruction Text Highlights
In this experiment, we are researching customer experiences in service settings. The exper-
iment should take about 10 minutes of your time and you will be compensated $0.50 plus
any bonus you accrue (up to $1.00). An overview of the experiment and instructions will
follow. The tasks will solicit information on your experience in the experiment and also
demographic information on yourself (e.g, gender, race, age range, education level, income
level, employment status, and state of residence). No other identifying information will
be obtained. All information will be stored in a secure, password-protected data storage
facility.
You may abandon the experiment at any time, however in order to receive any payment
for your participation in the experiment, you must complete all tasks according to the
directions provided. Therefore, please ensure you follow all directions in the experiment
carefully. If certain tasks are not completed according to the directions, your participation
in the experiment may be terminated.
Please note that in some research studies, the investigators cannot tell you exactly what
the study is about before you participate in the study. We will describe the tasks in the
study in a general way, but we can’t explain the real purpose of the study until after you
complete these tasks. When you are done, we will explain why we are doing this study,
what we are looking at, and any other information you should know about this study. You
will also be able to ask any questions you might have about the study’s purpose and the
tasks you did. Though we may not be able to explain the real purpose of the study until
after you complete the tasks, there are no additional risks to those that have been described
in this consent form.
In this experiment, you must wait to complete a customized demographic survey. Because
each survey is customized for a participant by a surveyor, you will be given a scheduled
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waiting time since the surveyor may also be processing other participants in the experiment.
Because we want the surveyor to process as many experiment participants as possible, you
must pay attention in the waiting area. Your actual waiting time may be complete before
or after the scheduled time, so you must pay attention to when your wait ends. To help you
keep track of your actual wait time and scheduled wait time, a wait timer and pink progress
bar (showing your progress towards your scheduled wait time) will be provided like the
one below. Your wait will end when your wait timer stops (not necessarily when the pink
progress bar stops). To help you pay attention in the waiting area, we will flash an image in
a designated image area for a brief time period immediately after your wait is complete (see
the example below). Please feel free to record what this image is. After clicking proceed,
you will be asked to identify the image correctly. If you identify the image correctly, you will
receive a $1.00 bonus payment bringing your total payment in the experiment to $1.50 if all
tasks are completed. Please click the→ button when you are ready to begin to experiment.
Comprehension Check Questions
Correct answers in bold.
• In this experiment, you will receive a scheduled waiting time for the surveyor.
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(True/False)
• Your actual waiting time for the surveyor will never be longer or shorter than the
scheduled waiting time. (True/False)
• Your actual waiting time will end when the wait timer stops (not necessarily when
the pink progress bar stops). (True/False)
• When my wait is over and I am ready to proceed to the surveyor, I will be asked to
identify the image that flashes briefly immediately following the end of my wait time.
(True/False)
• I may not write down any information regarding the image I must identify following
the end of my wait time. (True/False)
• If I correctly identify the image following the end of my wait time, I will receive a
bonus payment of $1.00, and upon completion of the experiment, I will receive a total
payment of $1.50. (True/False)
Incentive Compatibility Question
Correct answer in bold.
• What was the image that flashed for five seconds when your wait was complete? (Dog,
Rabbit, Hippopotamus, Elephant, Cat, None of these)
Satisfaction Question
• How would you rate your waiting experience for your surveyor? (Very poor, Poor,
Fair, Good, Very good)
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A.9. Drivers of Customer Satisfaction in a Tandem Queue: Additional Tables
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Table 28: Regression results for other regressors in the observational study
(1) (2) (3)
OLS OLS 2SLS
DV: SATISFACTION (TOTAL) (LOCATION)
Others in reception -0.095** -0.122*** -0.125***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.038)
Information on procedure day 0.405*** 0.415*** 0.418***
(0.107) (0.106) (0.104)
Helpful registration staff 0.098 0.103* 0.105*
(0.061) (0.061) (0.058)
Friendliness of nurses 0.069 0.069 0.071
(0.125) (0.125) (0.122)
Comfort of registration area 0.148 0.141* 0.134
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
Comfort in resting area 0.278*** 0.277*** 0.277***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.073)
Colonoscopy (Base: Not colonoscopy) -0.063 -0.075 -0.087
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Male (Base: Female) 0.079 0.075 0.081
(0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
Age (Base: 18-35 years)
36-53 years -0.004 -0.015 -0.025
(0.122) (0.123) (0.121)
54-71 years 0.070 0.063 0.058
(0.114) (0.116) (0.114)
72+ years 0.010 0.003 -0.006
(0.130) (0.132) (0.131)
Race (Base: Other/Unknown)
Black 0.051 0.043 0.054
(0.093) (0.096) (0.095)
Hispanic 0.039 0.015 -0.006
(0.244) (0.255) (0.261)
White -0.048 -0.059 -0.044
(0.090) (0.092) (0.090)
Time of day (Base: Before 10am)
10am to 11:59am -0.212*** -0.226*** -0.205**
(0.081) (0.081) (0.082)
12pm to 1:59pm -0.146* -0.163** -0.144*
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
After 2pm -0.098 -0.101 -0.121
(0.131) (0.132) (0.130)
Constant 1.572** 0.979* 2.223**
(0.625) (0.552) (0.906)
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Robust standard errors reported in parentheses
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